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I. INTRODUCTION

"Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."'
Although it has been over forty years since Dr. King wrote these
words, they still ring true. In particular, injustices to people wrongfully
imprisoned at the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba threaten
justice throughout the United States and the world. Abdul Zahir is one of
those people imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, and the injustice of his
imprisonment requires attention to the ongoing problems with prisoner
status determinations.2
Following the 9/11 attacks on New York City and the Pentagon,
President Bush declared that "[o]ur war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but

1. Martin Luther King Jr., Letterfrom BirminghamJail,(April16, 1963), reprintedin WHY
WE CAN'T WAIT, at 64 (Signet Classic 2000).
2. The author was appointed detailed military defense counsel for Abdul Zahir in February
2006.
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it does not end there."3 On September 21, 2001, President Bush approved
military plans to attack
4 Afghanistan, using the operational code name,
"Enduring Freedom."
Like most armed conflicts, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan produced
enemy prisoners, referred to as "detainees" and classified as "enemy
combatants." 5 These prisoners were either captured during hostilities or
apprehended for allegedly affiliating with al Qaeda or the Taliban.6 In an
effort to capture suspected terrorists, the United States showered
Afghanistan with leaflets which offered thousands of U.S. dollars for
information leading to the capture of al Qaeda or Taliban "murderers and
terrorists."7 Payment of bounty had become so prevalent' that some
analysts estimated that bounty captures made up almost 95% of prisoners
transferred to U.S. custody. 9 Additionally, opposition tribal leaders,
particularly those formerly associated with the Mujahideen and recently
with the Northern Alliance, were paid by the United States for handing
over anyone allegedly associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban.° The fact
Muj ahideen tribes had been fighting Pashtun tribes (Taliban were Pashtun)
for centuries was never considered in assessing the accusers' reliability. 1
On July 11, 2002, Abdul Zahir, a 32 year old Afghan, was arrested by
U.S. forces and taken to an unknown location in Afghanistan. He suspects
he was identified as al Qaeda and Taliban by an unknown source of a rival
3. President Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (Sept.
20,2001), in NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., FINAL REPORT, 9/11 REPORT
337 (2006), availableat http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm.
4. Id.
5. Since the invasion, the Bush administration had consistently referred to detainees as
"enemy combatants" rather than prisoners of war in order to prevent them from requesting legal
rights defined by the Geneva Conventions. Guy Taylor, Gitmo Inmate Not 'Enemy Combatant';
Panel Ruling Will Free Detainee, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, available at http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2004/sep/09/20040909-121235-8798r/.
6. Mark Denbeaux, THE 14 MYTHS OF GUANTANAMO, Senate Armed Services Committee,
Apr. 26, 2007, availableat http:/ilaw.shu.edu/media/fourteen_mythsof gtmo_final.pdf.
7. Afghanistan Leaflets, TF 11 -RP09-1, http://www.psywarrior.com/afghamleaf40.html (last
visited Nov. 13, 2008).
8. Nancy Gibbs & Viveca Novak, Inside "The Wire"; Security Breaches. Suicidal
Detainees.A Legal Challenge Heading to the Supreme Court. Welcome to Guantanamo,TIME,
Dec. 8, 2003, at 40; Denbeaux, supra note 6.
9. John Simpson, No Surprises in the War on Terror, BBC NEWS, Feb. 13, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.ukll/hi/world/middleeast/4708946.stm.
10. JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIALPOWER 69 (2006).
See also Denbeaux, supra note 6.
11. Several released prisoners in fact have contended that they were turned over by warlords
and arrested for cash based upon false information but for no other reason than for money and
revenge. Paisley Dodds & Matthew Pennington, Gitmo DetaineesSay They Were Sold, L.A. TIMES,
May 31, 2005, availableat http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0531 -10.htm.
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sub-tribe because he was Pashtun and because the source was paid. While
held in Afghanistan, Abdul Zahir was questioned for several months.
Because he worked as an interpreter for a suspected al Qaeda commander,
he could and did provide valuable intelligence. As a result, Abdul Zahir
was classified as a high value prisoner and subsequently taken to the
United States Naval Facility, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). There, he
was questioned without the presence of counsel for two more years. Based
on the information he had given, Abdul Zahir was given a Combatant
Status Review Tribunal, or "CSRT" and determined to be an enemy
combatant. 12
Prior to June 2004, no prisoner received hearings analogous to Geneva
Convention III, Article 5 tribunals. 3 Instead, prisoners were determined
as enemy combatants through a summary review of evidence by a military
intelligence officer.1 4 Prisoners were not entitled to examine or rebut any
of the evidence or call witnesses on their behalf. 5 Essentially, no due
process had been provided.
However, following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rasul v.
Bush, 6 the Department of Defense gave everyone at GTMO, including
Abdul Zahir, Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT). At his CSRT
in September 2004, Abdul Zahir was presumed an enemy combatant and
all of the evidence against him was presumed true. Although he did his
best to rebut the charges and evidence against him with reasoned
eloquence, Abdul Zahir was determined to be an enemy combatant.17 For
the next two years, Abdul Zahir was questioned without the presence of
a lawyer. Based on those interviews, the United States decided to
prosecute Abdul Zahir before a military commission.
On January 18, 2006 Abdul Zahir was charged with conspiracy, aiding
the enemy and attacking civilians. 18 In June 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court
12. The information provided in this section was provided to the author by Abdul Zahir. See
also Britta Sandberg, DishonoringaNation'sHistory,Spiegel Online International, Mar. 22,2007,
available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,473018,00.html. See also
SUMMARIZED SWORN DETAINEE STATEMENT (2006), http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/
csrt/Set 12 1179-1239.pdf#1.
13. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537-38.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
17. SUMMARIZED SWORN DETAINEE STATEMENT (2006), http://www.dod.
mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt/Set_12_1179-1239.pdf# 1.At his CSRT, Abdul Zahir claimed he served
as an interpreter to Abdul Hadi and did not know Hadi was al Qaeda. He also claimed he was an
employee and not a member of al Qaeda or Taliban. Abdul Zahir also knew the names of the
persons involved in a hand grenade attack on Canadian reporters, but did not know beforehand the
attack would occur.
18. Press Release, Department of Defense, Military Commission Charges Referred (Jan. 20,
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ruled the military commission system unconstitutional. 9 Since the ruling
in Hamdanv. Rumsfeld, the Government has not re-charged Abdul Zahir,
and for reasons that are outside the scope of this Article, is unlikely to ever
to re-charge Abdul Zahir. Like so many others at Guantanamo, Abdul
Zahir will remain imprisoned as an enemy combatant, in isolation, and
without the prospect for release. The United States claims that he is too
dangerous to be released. In reality, Abdul Zahir knows too much, and
simply put, cannot be released.
Proponents of the CSRT assert the Geneva Conventions do not apply
in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the CSRT ostensibly
provides due process, comparable to the Geneva Convention II (GCnI),
Article 520 and the Army Regulations 190-821 promulgated there under.
They claim detention is necessary in the GWOT for three primary reasons:
(1) to identify and prevent those individuals from returning to the
"battlefield"; (2) to identify those individuals for intelligence collection;
and (3) to identify those individuals for prosecution before a military
commission or domestic criminal court.22
Critics ofthe CSRT claim the Geneva Conventions should apply in the
GWOT and must apply to those at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO).23 They
claim that prisoners at GTMO were denied due rights guaranteed under
existing International Humanitarian Law and the Army Regulations. 24 As
such, CSRT invariably ensures almost everyone is determined to be an
enemy combatant and as such, many prisoners have been incorrectly
identified as such and therefore remain unjustly incarcerated at GTMO.
Since 9/11, the lines between criminal law and the traditional concepts
of armed conflict have blurred. As a result, many persons were taken
prisoner and held as enemy combatants despite the lack of process for
making such a determination. The CSRT not withstanding, many prisoners
remain incarcerated, unjustly they contend, based on unreliable,
uncorroborated evidence for which they cannot see, nor refute, nor crossexamine, nor know of its source.
2006), http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9248.
19. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
20. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GCIII].
21. U.S. Army Regulation 190-8, Opnavinst 3461.6, AM3I 31-304, MLO 3461.1, Enemy
Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees (Oct. 1, 1997)
[hereinafter AR 190-8], availableat www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/arl90-8.pdf.
22. See William Glaberson, CourtAdvancesMilitaryTrialsforDetainees,N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
25, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/25/washington/25gitmo.html?_r=l &
adxnnl= &orefrslogin&adxnnlx=1 190749600-3dvjLrfvbGEIQsPMtH2zCw.
23. See Peal, CombatantStatus Review Tribunals,infra note 29, at 1643.
24. Id. at 1643-44.
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This Article suggests that both the CSRT and the Article 5 tribunals are
inadequate to accurately determine the correct status of prisoners captured
in the GWOT. Neither the United States implementing regulations under
Article 5 nor the CSRT procedures provide the sufficient means for
determining status of prisoners. Because of these inadequacies, this Article
proposes a modified model that ensures due process is provided to
prisoners, particularly when making prisoner status determinations under
International Humanitarian Law.
As background, Part II discusses prisoner of war status and the benefits
afforded prisoners under the Conventions and Additional Protocols. It also
details the process for determining status of captured prisoners under the
Conventions. Part 1I details the process for determining status of captured
prisoners under the CSRT. Then Part IV provides a critical analysis of
both the Article 5 procedures and CSRT procedures relative to the GWOT.
Part IV also offers a modified approach for determining prisoner status in
the GWOT. Finally, Part V concludes the Article. At GTMO, Abdul Zahir
like everyone else will remain an enemy combatant for as long as the
GWOT lasts. This may be a very long time. Determining prisoner status
through a process that is far from fair, may just be the catalyst that
threatens justice everywhere, including the United States.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Generally
This Section will first address the sources and application of the law of
armed conflict, otherwise referred to as International Humanitarian Law
(IHL). This part will then discuss the kinds of persons in armed conflict:
civilians, lawful and unlawful combatants, and hors de combat and will
distinguish unlawful combatants from war criminals. Finally, the methods
for determining status of prisoners captured in traditional armed conflict
will briefly be addressed.
The Army Judge Advocate General's School teaches "The Right Kind
of Conflict/The Right Kind of Person" methodology when teaching
military lawyers the principles of distinction for prisoners of war." In this
methodology, Judge Advocates must first ask whether the parties to the
25.

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL CHARLOTTESVILLE VA

INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPT, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 86-87 (2006)
[hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK].
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conflict are States which have ratified the Geneva Conventions. If so,
Judge Advocates must then ask whether the armed conflict is of an
international or internal nature.27 If conflict is international, then in the
second part to the methodology, the Judge Advocate must ask whether the
prisoner is the right kind of person entitled to prisoner of war status.28 As
it will become more clear, the United States followed a similar
methodology in the GWOT when confronted with prisoner identification
issues. This Article will follow a similar methodology by asking whether
the GWOT is the right kind of conflict for application of the Geneva
Conventions, and if so, whether captured Taliban and al Qaeda are the
right kind of persons entitled to protection under the Geneva Convention.29
B. The Right Kind of Conflict
1. Sources of the Law
a. International Humanitarian Law
The sources for 11IL are found in several places, inter alia, the Lieber
Code of 1863, the Hague Regulations of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of
26. See Maj. Sean Watts, HostileProtectedPersons or "Extra-Conventional Persons: "How
Unlawful Combatants in the War on Terrorism Posed Extraordinary Challenges for Military
Attorneys and Commanders, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 681, 723 (Feb. 2005) (citing OPERATIONAL
LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 25).
27. Id. at 722.
28. Id. at 724.
29. Whether the GWOT is an "armed conflict" and falls within the ambit of the Conventions
is outside the scope of this Article. See Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status after 9/11: Attacks
on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 325 (2003). It can be said that at least initially the U.S.
conflict in Afghanistan was an international armed conflict whereby prisoners should have been
protected and subject to Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions. After June 2002 however,
the Loya Jirga appointed Hamid Karzai imprimatur on the transitional government. On June 19,
2002, a new cabinet was established. See ICRC Paper, International Humanitarian Law and
Terrorism: Questions and Answers (May 5, 2004), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.
nsf/html/5YNLEV; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244-45 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[A] state is
an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own
government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such
entities..."); SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW 35-36 (2006); Derek Jinks, The Laws of
War: Past, Present, and Future: Article: The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the
"Global War on Terrorism," 46 VA. J. INT'LL. 165, 178-80 (2005); Robert Peal, Combatant Status
Review Tribunals and the Unique Nature of the War on Terror, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1629, 1633-34
(2005). However, the conflict with al Qaeda is non-international but occurring within the territory
of a High Contracting Party, and is thus subject to Common Article 3. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 629-30 (2006) (quoting Common Article 3).
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1949 (and two Additional Protocols of 1977), and customary international
law.3° The Geneva Conventions are comprised of four separate
Conventions. Every nation, or "state," including the United States, is a
party to the Conventions. However, not every state is a party to the
Additional Protocols. Although the United States has not ratified either
Additional Protocol,3 ' many scholars agree that several portions of both
Protocols have become part of customary international law.32 Together,
these works make up what will be referred to hereinafter as IHL.
b. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
In addition to IHL, the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) provides law relevant to prisoner due process rights.3 3
Specifically, Article 9 prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention where anyone
"deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings before a court, in order that court may decide without delay
on the lawfulness of his detention., 34 Additionally, Article 14 provides
30. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFuCT 5-12 (2004). See generally Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the

Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GCI]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3114,
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GCII]; GCIII, supra note 20; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter GCIV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection ofVictims ofInternational Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter API]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609 [hereinafter APII].
31. See DINSTEIN, supra note 30, at 5-12. See also INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW-TREATIES & DOCUMENTS (2005), available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView.
32. The Reagan Administration supported several provisions of API. API, supranote 30, arts.
75 & 44, 2 (first sentence), 3 (first sentence). See Michael J. Matheson, The United States
Position on the Relation of CustomaryInternationalLaw to the 1977 ProtocolsAdditional to the
1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 415, 419 (1987). See also Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-33 (2006).
33. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 5, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR], availableat http://www.unhchr.ch/htmil/menu3/b/accpr.htm. Both the
United States and Afghanistan were parties to the ICCPR at the time when the United States
invaded Afghanistan. See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RATIFICATIONS
AND RESERVATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS,

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/4.htm. See also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 693, 735 (2004) ("the United States ratified the Covenant on the express understanding that
it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts.").
34. ICCPR, supra note 33, art. 9(4).
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specific minimum guarantees for those accused of a criminal offense,
including the right to "examine, or have examined, the witnesses against
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on
his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him. 35 The U.N.
Committee on Human Rights General Comment recognizes that Article 14
"applies not only to procedures for the determination of criminal charges
against individuals but also3 6to procedures to determine their rights and
obligations in a suit at law.
It is important to note that the ICCPR provides derogation ofjudicial
review "[iun time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed," but states may
not derogate if such measures are inconsistent with their other obligations
under international law and do not involve discrimination.37 Regardless,
Article 5 ensures that certain minimal rights, particularly those
fundamental human rights, may never be derogated.38
2. Application of the Law
a. The Geneva Conventions
Bearing in mind the "W" in GWOT representing "war" implies armed
conflict, the Geneva Conventions is logically the first source of law
relevant to prisoners. The Conventions apply "to all cases of declared war
or of any other armed conflict39 which may arise between two or more of
35. Id.art. 14(3)(e).
36. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 13: EqualityBefore the Courts and
the Right to a FairandPublicHearingby an IndependentCourtEstablishedby Law (Art.14), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (Apr. 13, 1984), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/(Symbol)ibb722416a295f264c 12563ed0049dfbd?Opendocument.
37. ICCPR, supra note 33, art. 4(1).
38. Id.art. 5.
There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental
human rights recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant
pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext that the present
Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser
extent.
See id.art. 5(2).
39. "Armed Conflict" is not defined in any of the treaties. The International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has defined it as follows: "[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there
is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State." Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
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the High Contracting Parties,4" even if the state of war is not recognized
by one of them."'" This provision, common to all four Conventions, is
known as Common Article 2, and is applicable to "classical international
armed conflict, '4 2 which normally exists when force is directed by one
state against another, regardless of duration.43 It may also exist when a
state intervenes in an internal armed conflict either with its own armed
forces or through intermediaries.'
Jurisdiction
70 (Oct. 2, 1995). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Commentary provides "[s]peaking generally, it must be recognized that the conflicts referred to in
Article 3 are armed conflicts, with 'armed forces' on either side engaged in 'hostilities' - conflicts,
in short, which are in many respects similar to international war ..."INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: 111 GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960)

[hereinafter ICRC Commentary III]. Regardless, the existence of whether hostilities amount to an
armed conflict is factual rather than legal and the declaration of war between parties is irrelevant
in determining whether a state of armed conflict exists. HELEN DUFFY, THE 'WARON TERROR' AND
THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (2005). See also DINSTEIN, supra note 30, at 15.
40. A "Party" does not need to be a signatory to the Conventions, nor "even represent a legal
entity capable of undertaking international obligations." ICRC Commentary III, supra note 39, at
37. See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. at 557, 628-29 (2006).
41. GCIII, supra note 20, art. 2.
42. API is likewise intended to "apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to"
the four Geneva Conventions and is to "include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their
right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration
on Principles of International Law .... See API, supra note 30, art. 1, 3 & 4.
43. See ICRC Commentary III, supra note 39, 1.
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of
members of the armed forces (8) is an armed conflict within the meaning of
Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes
no difference how long the conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes place, or how
numerous are the participating forces; it suffices for the armed forces of one
Power to have captured adversaries falling within the scope of Article 4. Even if
there has been no fighting, the fact that persons covered by the Convention are
detained is sufficient for its application. The number of persons captured in such
circumstances is, of course, immaterial.
Id.
44. See Tadic, Case No. 1T-94-1-I,

84.

[I]n case of an internal armed conflict breaking out in the territory of a State, it
may become international {or depending upon the circumstances, be international
in character alongside an internal armed conflict) if (i) another State intervenes
in that conflict through its troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants
in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other State.
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For internal armed conflicts, on the other hand, Common Article 3
(common to all four Conventions), applies when armed conflict is "not of
an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties."'' 5 Common Article 3 applies to persons who are not
associated with a state party involved in an armed conflict which occurs
"in the territory of' a state party. It does not however involve armed
conflict between nations (whether signatories or not).4 6 For internal armed
conflicts, Common Article 3 provides the baseline, or minimum
protection, for those persons who are neither associated with a party or
state to the conflict (occurring in a party's territory).47
In addition to the Geneva Convention I (GCI) through the Geneva
Convention IV (GCIV), the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (API) Article 75 is now considered part of customary
international law and provides certain minimum guarantees for those
captured during international armed conflict, including the right "for an
accused to be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence
alleged against him. ' s Article 75 also guarantees the presumption of
innocence and the right to examine witnesses against an accused.4 9
Id.
45. See GCIII, supra note 20, art. 3. Similarly, APII is intended to supplement Common
Article 3 without modifying its existing conditions or application, and applies to all armed conflicts
not covered by API
and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which,
under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to
implement this Protocol.
APII, supra note 30, art. 1, 1. API does not apply to internal disturbances like "riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts." Id. art.
1, 2.
46. ICRC Commentary III, supra note 39, 1.
47. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006).
48. API, supra note 30, art. 75.
49. API Article 75 provides:
No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person found
guilty of a penal offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a
conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting
the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure, which include
the following: ... (d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law; ... (g) anyone charged with an offence shall have
the right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain
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b. ICCPR
In addition to the Conventions, lCCPR provides a relevant source of
IHL applicable to the GWOT. But Article 2(1) specifically limits
application of the ICCPR to "all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant... " 50
Whether the ICCPR requires the individual to be within the State Party's
territory and subject to its jurisdiction or requires territory or jurisdiction
has been the subject of much debate, particularly with regards to the
prisoners held at the Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The U.N.
Human Rights Committee contends that the ICCPR applies
extraterritorially and that the State's jurisdiction extends past its borders.5
In its General Comment 3 1, the Committee states that "a State party must
respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within
the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated
within the territory of the State Party" and
the enjoyment of the Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of
States Parties [sic] but must also be available to all individuals,
regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as asylum seekers,
refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who may find
themselves
in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State
52
Party.
Significantly, the Committee noted that
[t]his principle also applies to those within the power or effective
control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory,
regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective
control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national

the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him.
Id.See also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 635 (Both the ICCPR and API Article 75 provide certain
minimum rights that have been recognized as part of customary international law).
50. See ICCPR, supra note 33, art. 2(1).
51. U.N. Human Rights Comm., GeneralComment No. 31 [80] Natureof the GeneralLegal
ObligationImposedon States Partiesto the Covenant,U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 13 (May
26,2004), availableathttp://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.C.2 1. Rev. 1.Add. 13.En?
Opendocument.
52. Id.
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contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation. 3
The United States has since taken a contrary position to Article 2(1) and
contends5 that
the ICCPR does not apply to GTMO because it is not a U.S.
4
territory.
C. The Right Kind of Person
1. Types of Prisoners in IHL
Besides asking whether the GWOT is the right kind of conflict, the
next question in the Judge Advocate methodology is whether the GWOT
detainees are the right kinds of persons. In doing so, this part examines the
types of prisoners in IHL.
In IHL, there are two general categories of prisoners, non-combatants
and combatants. Non-combatants are civilians. Combatants include two
sub-groups, lawful combatants and unlawful combatants. Lawful
combatants include prisoners of war and hors de combat. Unlawful
combatants may include war criminals.
a. Civilians
Civilians are defined by the Conventions as anyone not belonging to
"one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A(l), (2), (3) and
(6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol."55 If there
is doubt "whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to
be a civilian. 56 For international armed conflict, treatment of civilians is
addressed in GCIV 7 and API, Part IV.58 Generally, IHL prohibits civilians
from engaging in hostilities.59 Civilians who do actively or directly engage
in hostilities6" become unlawful combatants and can be prosecuted as
53. Id.
54. MURPHY, supra note 29, at 306.
55. API, supra note 30, art. 50.
56. Id.
57. See generally GCIV, supra note 30.
58. API, supra note 30, Part IV.
59. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 53-54
(2004).
60. Whether a civilian has engaged in hostilities is a question of fact. See id. at 54. "Direct
or active participation" in hostilities by civilians is required before a civilian becomes a combatant.
DINSTErN, supra note 30, at 27. Civilians can be employed by, and may accompany, the armed
forces without losing status as civilians, provided they do not engage in hostilities. UK MINIsTRY
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such.6 Once a civilian becomes an unlawful combatant, he loses civilian
protections afforded by the Conventions and will not be entitled to
prisoner of war status on capture.62
b. Combatants
The next type of prisoner in IHL is the combatant. The term
"combatant" does not appear in the Conventions. Rather, it first appears
in API Article 43 and includes members of the Party's armed forces with
a right to engage in hostilities.63 Unlike the GCII Article 4 test,' Article
44(3) does not require uniforms or a fixed recognizable symbol.65 Instead
it requires combatants to openly carry their weapons while deploying for
attack.66 Combatants must comply with this two part test to receive
prisoner of war status on capture. 6 ' Those who do not qualify will
nonetheless receive many of the same protections afforded prisoners of
war under GCIII.68
The U.S. Army defines a "combatant" as "[a]nyone engaging in
hostilities in an armed conflict on behalf of a party to the conflict."69 This
definition references GCI Article 13 and GCIII Article 4 to include
members of the "armed forces of a Party to a conflict; militia, volunteer
corps, and organized resistance movements belonging to a Party....
In the least, both definitions require a level of direct participation in
hostilities before someone is classified as a combatant. According to the
Commentaries for API, Article 51 "direct participation means acts of war
which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the

supra note 59, at 53-54. Civilians accompanying the armed forces, including labor
units or supply contractors, will usually be treated as prisoners of war if captured. See GCIII, supra
note 20, art. 4(4).
61. See DINSTEIN, supra note 30, at 29. See alsoProsecutorv. Delalic,Case No. IT-96-2 1-T,
Judgment, 1568 (Nov. 16, 1998), availableat http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/judgement/
cel-aj010220.pdf.
62. See UKMINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 59, at 38, 53. See also GCIV, supra note 30,
art. 5. Distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants is discussed infra.
63. API, supra note 30, art. 43(2) (combatants do not include medical personnel or
chaplains).
64. See GCIII, supra note 20, art. 4.
65. API, supra note 30, art. 44(3).
66. Id.
67. Id. art. 44(4).
68. Id.
69. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 12.
70. Id. at 12.
OF DEFENCE,
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personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces."71 The
Commentaries to API, Article 43 add that "[d]irect participation in
hostilities implies a direct causal relationship between the activity engaged
in and the harm done to the enemy at the time and the place where the
activity takes place. 72 However, there must be "a clear distinction
between direct participation in hostilities" and mere "participation in the
war effort."73
For example, sentries or guards are deemed to directly participate in
hostilities.74 Similarly, the driver who delivers ammunition to the
combatants and the person gathering military intelligence in enemy
territory are both direct participants and therefore combatants.75 The
distinction becomes blurred when civilian contractors operate drones
engaged in combat, or when civilians retrieve military intelligence data
from satellites while located in their home country.76 The distinction is
even murkier when civilians provide financing to purchase weapons by an
enemy State. Some commentators have opined that the mere contribution
to the general war effort (vis-A-vis supply food to combatants) is sufficient
to be deemed a combatant.77
Essentially, combatant status depends upon the extent to which an
individual has contributed to and advanced the party's war efforts, and
whether that conduct is close in time and location to the hostilities.78
Civilians who engage in hostilities on the other hand are unlawful
combatants and as such, may be prosecuted under criminal law.7 9

71. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS COMMENTARY ON THE PROTOCOL
ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 AND RELATING TO THE
PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL I) OF 8 JUNE 1977, at

619 [hereinafter AP COMMENTARY]. See also Michael E. Guillory, Civilianizingthe Force: Is the
United States Crossingthe Rubicon, 51 A.F.L. REV. 111, 117 (2001).
72. AP COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 516.
73. Id. at 619.
74. Id. at 515-16.
75. DINSTEIN, supra note 30, at 27.
76. Id. at 27-28.
77. Id. at 28.
78. See id. at 27-28.
79. See id. at 31; see Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-2 1-T, Judgment, 750 (Nov. 16,
1998).
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(1) Lawful v. Unlawful Combatants
(a) Generally
(i) Ex ParteQuirin
The distinction between "lawful" and "unlawful" combatants is
addressed in this part. Essentially, the lawful combatant follows 1IHL while
the unlawful combatant does not. The Conventions address the duty to do
so in API, Article 44(2), which requires combatants to "comply with the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict."8
However, neither the Conventions nor the Additional Protocols
distinguish between "lawful" and "unlawful" combatants.8' The "lawful"
qualifier first appeared Ex ParteQuirin,in which the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld military commissions to prosecute German saboteurs who wore
civilian clothes.82 In that case, the Court distinguished, for the first time,
the difference between a lawful combatant and an unlawful combatant:
By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a
distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations
of belligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and
unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and
detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful
combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in
addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military
tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. The spy
who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a
belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information
and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who
without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of
waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples
of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the
status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war
subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals.83

80.
81.
82.
83.

See API, supra note 30, art. 44(2).
See GCIII, supra note 20, art. 4.
See Ex ParteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942).
Id.
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(ii) Hamdi & Hamdan
Since Ex Parte Quirin, the U.S. Supreme Court has revisited the
unlawful combatant issue. 4 In Hamdi, the Court made a passing reference
to lawful combatants but essentially ratified the principle articulated in Ex
parte Quirin that "[t]he capture and detention of lawful combatants and
the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal
agreement and practice,' are 'important incident[s] of war."'' 5
However, the issue in Hamdi was not whether the status as a combatant
was lawful or unlawful, but whether Hamdi, who was a U.S. citizen, could
be held as an "enemy" combatant.86 Status as an "enemy" combatant had
been articulated in Ex Parte Quirin, but this was the first time the Court
addressed the issue since 9/11 and the GWOT. The Court recognized that
the definition for enemy combatant was not well settled.87 Instead of
giving a definition, the Court simply adopted the definition provided by
the Government as someone who is "'part of or supporting forces hostile
to the United States or coalition partners' and 'engaged in an armed
conflict against the United States' to justify his88 detention in the United
States for the duration of the relevant conflict.,
(b) Prisoners of War
(i) Definitions
Besides unlawful combatants, IHL also includes lawful combatants,
who on capture by the enemy qualify as prisoners of war. Derived from
the Hague Convention of War on Land, the Conventions provide four
criteria, now part of customary international law, for defining a prisoner
of war. 89 Accordingly, a prisoner of war must satisfy the following
minimum criteria 0 :
84. See generallyHamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
85. Id. (quoting Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28, 30). The subject of unlawful combatants
was similarly raised by the dissent in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 681-82 (2006).
86. See generallyHamdi, 542 U.S. 507.
87. Id. at 533.
88. Id. at 526.
89. DINSTEIN, supra note 30, at 35.
90. The Conventions set out two instances when prisoner-of-war status is granted, provided
that the four conditions are fulfilled. Prisoner-of-war status is given to (1) "Members of the armed
forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of
such armed forces," or to (2) other militia members and "members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and
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(a) [t]hat of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates; 9'
92
(b) [t]hat of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) [t]hat of carrying arms openly; 93
(d) [t]hat of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war. 94
(ii) Advantages for Status
Like the Hague Conventions, the Lieber Code is also part of customary
international law. According to the Lieber Code, the primary advantage for
being a prisoner of war is combat immunity. Combat immunity is given
operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied," provided the four
minimal conditions are fulfilled. GCIII, supra note 20, arts. 4(A)(1)-(2).
91. Id. art. 4A(2)(a).
92. Id. art. 4A(2)(b).
93. Id. art. 4A(2)(c).
94. Id. art. 4A(2)(d). The Additional Protocols define prisoners of war as members of the
armed forces who are
under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates,
even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized
by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary
system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict.
API, supranote 30, art. 43(1). API does not necessarily require the wearing of uniforms but it does
define members of the armed forces as "combatants" qualifying for prisoner of war status.
Although they do not distinguish themselves from civilians, they may retain prisoner of war status
provided they carry their arms openly during each military engagement, and each time the weapons
must be visible to the adversary while engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching
of an attack in which the combatant participates. See id. art. 44(3). Those who fail this test, like
those criminally accused, are given all of the same rights provided prisoners of war in GCIII where
the prisoner is to be "tried and punished for any offences he has committed." Id. art. 44(4).
According to the ICRC Commentaries, these are the same rights found in GCIII, articles 82-108.
See ICRC Commentary III, supranote 39. For belligerents who have engaged in hostilities, but fail
to qualify as either a prisoner of war or as a civilian, API article 45, paragraph 3 provides that they
shall
be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as a minimum, the
protection provided by this Article without any adverse distinction based upon
race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria. Each
Party shall respect the person, honour, convictions and religious practices of all
such persons.
See API, supra note 30, art. 75(1).
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to combatants for their legitimate or lawful conduct during armed
conflict.95 Once captured by the enemy, (lawful) combatants are entitled
to prisoner of war status and may only be liable for crimes committed
against the "captor's army or people, committed before he was captured,
and for which he has not been punished by his own authorities." 96 Prisoner
of war status does not protect
the combatant from prosecution for war
97
crimes or violations of IHL.
Since Lieber's time, the Conventions have codified many of the same
principles and have given additional minimum guarantees to prisoners,
including without limitation: the right to humane treatment; the right to
due process; the right to be released on the cessation of hostilities; the
right to speak with international protective agencies, and most importantly,
combat immunity.9"
Included in the guarantee to due process, prisoners are entitled to trials
by independent and impartial courts recognized by the detaining state, 99
the prohibition on ex post facto laws, the prohibition of coerced
confessions, the assistance of counsel,0 0 the right to a speedy trial, and
credit for pre-conviction time served.'' Without prisoner of war status,
prisoners do not get many of these rights. In the GWOT, no one at GTMO
has been declared a prisoner of war, and therefore, many have been denied
these fundamental rights.
As previously indicated, prisoner of war status is dependant on whether
the combatant was lawful or unlawful. If the combatant complied with
IHL,he is a lawful combatant, and as such, is entitled to combat immunity
for his participation in hostilities. Like the civilian who has engaged in
hostilities, the combatant who fails to follow IHL is an unlawful
combatant and can be prosecuted for his participation in hostilities.0 2
In addition, combatants, whether lawful or unlawful, may be detained
in order to prevent them from returning to the battlefield.' °3 Prisoners of
95. Lieber Code, General Order 100, art. 57 (1863), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/
law/liebercode.htm.
96. Id. art. 59.
97. Id.
98. See GCIII, supra note 20, arts. 13, 17, 21-48, 99-108, 118-119, & 8-11.
99. Id.art. 84.
100. Id.art. 99.
101. Id. art. 103.
102. DINSTEIN,supranote 30, at 30. See alsoDerekJinks, TheDecliningSignificanceofPOW
Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 367, 376 n.38 (2004).
103. Yasmin Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-of-War Status, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS, 571, 572
(Sept. 2002) ("[C] aptivity in war is 'neither revenge, nor punishment, but solely protective custody,
the only purpose of which is to prevent the prisoners of war from further participation in the war"'
(quoting decision ofNuremberg Military Tribunal, reprintedin 41 AM. J. INT'LL. 172,229 (1947)),
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war may be kept as long as hostilities continue." Once hostilities end,
prisoners of war will be released and repatriated, "without delay". 5 When
hostilities end, the warring parties in most instances draft a cessation
document that includes, among other things, the release and repatriation
of prisoners.0 6 Although the detaining powers may release prisoners and
civilians, the detaining powers may continue to hold prisoners for
prosecution for suspected war crimes, crimes committed while
incarcerated, pre-capture domestic crimes or violations of IHL.' °7 But
continued detention must not be arbitrary and must be based on
established legal grounds.10 8
(c) Hors de Combat
The next type of prisoner in IHL is the hors de combat. Hors de combat
are combatants that either through choice (i.e., by surrender) or
circumstance (i.e., wounded) are removed from combat. 0 9 If such person
is captured, then he shall be treated as a prisoner of war.11 0

availableat http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/ htmlall/5FLBZK/$File/irrc 847 Naqvi.pdf.
104. See GCIII, supra note 20, art. 118 ("Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated
without delay after the cessation of active hostilities"). See also Hague Convention (II) on Laws
and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, art. 20 (as soon as possible after
"conclusion of peace"); Hague Convention (IV), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, art. 20 ("conclusion
of peace"); GCIII, supra note 20, art. 118 (repatriation should be accomplished with the least
possible delay after cessation of active hostilities). See also Jordan J. Praust, Judicial Power to
Determinethe Status andRights ofPersonsDetainedwithout Trial, 44 HARV. INT'LL.J. 503, 51011 (2003) (Prisoners of war "can be detained during an armed conflict, but "the detaining country
must release and repatriate them 'without delay after the cessation of active hostilities,' unless they
are being lawfully prosecuted or have been lawfully convicted of crimes and are serving
sentences") (citing GCIII, supra note 20, arts. 118, 85, 99, 119, 129).
105. GCIII, supra note 20, art. 118.
106. See Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terroristat a Time: A Non Criminal
Detention Modelfor Holding and Releasing GuantanamoBay Detainees,29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 149, 171 (2005).
107. See GCIII, supra note 20, art. 119.
108. See id. arts. 99, 102, 118, 119; ICCPR, supra note 33, art. 9.
109. See DINsTrN, supra note 30, at 28.
110. Id.
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(2) Unlawful Combatants and War Criminals
(a) War Crime-Defined
Like lawful combatants or civilians, unlawful combatants may be war
criminals. "There is no single binding definition of war crimes.""'
However, the most comprehensive definition comes from the Rome Statue
of the International Criminal Court which incorporates IHL into its
definition to include grave breaches of the Conventions and other serious
violations of the laws of war.112 The grave breaches are for the most part
111. See id. at 229.
112. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statuteromefra.htm (last visited Nov. 14,2008). War Crimes include,
inter alia:
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any
of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions
of the relevant Geneva Convention: (i) Willful killing... (iii) Willfully causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body or health; (iv) Extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly;... (b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of
international law, namely, any of the following acts: (i) Intentionally directing
attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not
taking direct part in hostilities; (ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian
objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives; (iii) Intentionally
directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles
involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection
given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;
...(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the
national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities. (c) In the
case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any
of the following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the
hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:
(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture; (ii) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (iii) Taking of hostages; ...
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts
not of an international character, within the established framework of international
law... It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when
there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups.
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copied from the Conventions and are accepted as war crimes. The "other
serious violations"3 are generally accepted norms of customary
international law. 1
In the United States, "war crimes" are defined by the War Crimes Act,
which references the Conventions and Hague Convention, among
others." 4 But jurisdiction for prosecution under the War Crimes Act is
limited in the U.S. Federal Courts to cases where the accused or victim is
a member of the U.S. armed forces or a U.S. national." 5
The U.S. Army broadly defines war crimes to include every violation
of the law of war." 6 A "war crime" is a "technical expression for a
violation of the law of war by any person or persons,
military or civilian.
'' 17
Every violation of the law of war is a war crime.
(b) Distinction between Unlawful Combatants and War Criminals
It is important to understand that unlawful combatants may not
necessarily be war criminals. Similarly, war criminals may not necessarily
be unlawful combatants. For instance, on the one hand, civilians who
directly engage in hostilities, become unlawful combatants and can be
detained and prosecuted as such. On the other hand, civilians who do not
Id.
113. See DINSTEIN, supra note 30, at 232. See also API, supra note 30, art. 85.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000). War crimes are defined as
(1) as a grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva 12
August 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a
party; (2) prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of the Annex to the Hague
Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18
October 1907; (3) which constitutes a violation of common Article 3 (as defined
in subsection (d)) when committed in the context of and in association with an
armed conflict not of an international character; or any protocol to such
convention to which the United States is a party and which deals with noninternational armed conflict; or (4) of a person who, in relation to an armed
conflict and contrary to the provisions of the Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended at
Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996), when the United
States is a party to such Protocol, willfully kills or causes serious injury to
civilians.
Id.
115. Id. (b).
116. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANuAL: THE LAW
OF LAND WARFARE 799 (1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10], available at http://www.afsc.army.mil/
gc/files/FM27-10.pdf.
117. Id. at 178.
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directly engage in hostilities, although non-combatants, could still be war
criminals depending on their conduct. For instance, the civilian who orders
no quarter be given, wages an aggressive war, orders genocide, or
authorizes torture would be criminally liable for those war crimes." 8 Such
was the case for the civilian Nazi leaders convicted at Nuremburg. 9
Although lawful combatants receive combat immunity for lawful
conduct in the battlefield (and are given prisoner of war status), they may
still be prosecuted by either domestic courts or by an international tribunal,
12
provided the lawful combatants violated IHL or committed a war crime.
Unlike prosecution in the domestic courts, Article 85 of GCHI provides
that prosecution for war crimes does not affect a detainee's status as a
prisoner of
war.'2 ' This provision remains a matter of interpretation,
22
1
however.
On the other hand, unlawful combatants may be criminally prosecuted
under the domestic laws of the State exercising jurisdiction.'23 At the same
time, an unlawful combatant may also be a war criminal, provided his
conduct rises to such a level by committing, inter alia, a "serious breach"
of the Geneva Conventions. 124 The detaining power may either prosecute
the unlawful combatant under its domestic laws or proceed under
international law and the IHL.' 25 However, the unlawful combatant may
under domestic law after his status as a prisoner of war
only be prosecuted
126
has been denied.
Regardless, both lawful and unlawful combatants remain legitimate
military targets. Once they fall into the enemy hands, though, the two
groups are treated differently.'27 The lawful combatant will receive
prisoner of war status and cannot be prosecuted (other than for war crimes)
for participating in hostilities. The unlawful combatant, however, is not a
prisoner of war and can be detained and prosecuted, not only for war

118. DiNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 233-34.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
engaged

See id.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235; GCIII, supra note 20, art. 85.
DINSTEIN, supra note 30, at 235.
Id. at 234.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 235.
Civilians, on the other hand, can never be targeted, provided they are not combatants
in hostilities.
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crimes he committed, but also for his participation in hostilities. 2
Civilians, may not be detained other than for prosecution for war crimes.
2. Methods for Determining Status of Prisoners Captured in Armed
Conflict - GCI - Art. 5
Common Article 2 applies in international armed conflicts. 129 In such
instances, the Conventions provide a means for determining status of
prisoners when the detaining power has concerns for the actual status of
the prisoner. 30 In other words, if the detaining power cannot distinguish
the prisoner as a prisoner of war or civilian, then there remains sufficient
doubt that should be resolved by a tribunal. 3 ' Until status is resolved by
a tribunal, however, then "such persons shall enjoy the protection of the
present Convention. ' 1 2 In other words, the prisoner will be entitled to
prisoner of war status unless otherwise determined by a tribunal.' The
burden is on the detaining power to show the prisoner is not a prisoner of
war, unless the status is not in question.'34
If the detaining power decides a prisoner should be tried for an offense
arising out of armed conflict or associated hostilities, then the prisoner
"shall have the right to assert his entitlement to prisoner of war status
before a judicial tribunal and to have that question adjudicated."' 35
It is interesting to note that since the Vietnam era, the United States
military has adopted and used a set of regulations which implement Article
5 tribunals intended to resolve status for captured persons.'36 The current
regulations are binding upon all branches of the United States Armed
Forces and found in Army Regulation 190-8, titled "Enemy Prisoners of
War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees". 37 AR
190-8 tribunals were conducted by the United States in Vietnam although
many Viet Cong insurgents failed the Article 4 criteria for prisoners of war

128. See Manooher Mofidi &Amy E. Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisonersof War ":
The Law and Politics ofLabels, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 70 (2003). See also DINSTEN, supra
note 30, at 30-3 1.
129. GCIII, supra note 20, art. 2.
130. Id. art. 4.
131. Id. art. 5; DINSTEIN, supra note 30, art. 5.
132. GCIII, supra note 20, at 235.
133. See id. art. 5; DINSTEIN, supra note 30, at 235.
134. This presumption is reaffirmed in API, Article 45, where the person falling into the hands
of the enemy "shall be presumed to be a prisoner of war, and therefore shall be protected by the
Third Convention." See API, supra note 30, art. 45(1).
135. See id. art. 45(2).
136. AR 190-8, supra note 21.
137. Id.
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(particularly the failure to wear a distinctive sign or uniform).138 Similarly,
the United States conducted Article 5 tribunals in Grenada for prisoners
of the Cuban military and the Grenadian People's Revolutionary Army. 39
'
Finally, the United States conducted Article 5 tribunals in the early stages
of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 140
Army Regulation (AR) 190-8 outlines the procedures for convening an
Article 5 tribunal. 14 ' The tribunal is composed of three commissioned
officers. 142 The Regulation also includes procedures for swearing the
members, 143 for keeping a written record,'" for keeping open proceedings
unless security dictates otherwise, 145 for advisement of rights, 146 for
presence of the person and provisions for an interpreter,4l 7 for calling
witnesses, 148 and for testifying. 149 Evidence is reviewed by a
preponderance standard and a decision is rendered by a majority of the
tribunal. 50 There is no process for reviewing decisions and prisoners are
not entitled to a lawyer.' 5 '
The tribunal may make any of the following findings:
1. Recommended RP [Retained Personnel], entitled to EPW [Enemy
Prisoner of War] protections, who should be considered forcertification
as a medical, religious, or volunteer aid society RP;

138. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICES, TREATMENT OF
BATLEFIELD DETAINEES IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 37 (2006), availableat http://www.fas.org/

sgp/crs/terror/RL31367.pdf.
139. Id.; but see Geoffrey Corn et al., Understandingthe Distinct Functionof the Combatant
Status Review Tribunals: A Response to Blocher, 116 YALE L.J. Pocket Part 327, 332 (2007).
140. THE CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS (CLAMO), LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED
FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: VOLUME I, MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS (11

SEPTEMBER 2001 To 1MAY 2003) 43-46 (2004) [hereinafter CLAMO, LEGAL LESSONS: VOLUME
I], availableat http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/clamo-vl.pdf. See also THE CENTER FOR LAW
AND MILITARY OPERATIONS (CLAMO), LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ:
VOLUME II, FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS (2 MAY 2003 TO 30 JUNE 2004) 71-73 (2005)
[hereinafter CLAMO, LEGAL LESSONS: VOLUME II], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/
army/clamo-v2.pdf.
141. AR 190-8, supra note 21.
142. Id. 1-6c.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
AR

1-6e(1).
1-6e(2).
1-6e(3).
1-6e(4).
1-6e(5).
1-6e(6).
1-6e(7).
1-6e(9).
190-8, supra note 21.
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2. Innocent Civilian who should be immediately returned to his home or
released;
3. Civilian Internee who for reasons of operational security, or1probable
52
cause incident to criminal investigation, should be detained.
Those determined to be something other than a prisoner of war, yet
retained, are "a 'protected person' within the meaning of Article 4,
' This category could conceivably
GCIV."153
include unlawful combatants
54
who are held but not prosecuted.
The options listed in AR 190-8 are by no means exclusive since they
are just "possible board determinations."' 55 Not included amongst those
options are "unlawful combatant," "enemy combatant," and "unlawful
enemy combatant." Since September 11th, these terms have become
increasingly prominent in our lexicon, particularly as they relate to the
GWOT.

152. Id. 1-6e(10)(b-d).
153. See generally FM 27-10, supra note 116. Protected persons, like civilians, are
distinguished from prisoners of war under GCIV, and are given many of the same guarantees as
prisoners of war, including but not limited to the right to humane treatment, certain due process
rights, freedom from coercive interrogations, and the right to be repatriated. Jinks, supra note 102,
at 380.
154. The International Committee for the Red Cross opines that there are two categories of
prisoner. Prisoners are either civilians (and consequently, protected persons), or prisoners of war,
and there are no gaps between the protections afforded under GCIII and GCIV. See
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF

12 AUGUST 1949: IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSON
INTIME OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet, ed., 1958) [hereinafter ICRC Commentary IV]. According to the
GCIV Commentary, there is no intermediate status: anyone in enemy hands is either a prisoner of
war or a civilian. Id. 4. Noting the ICRC Commentary to GCIV, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has similarly noted
there is no gap between the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. If an
individual is not entitled to the protections of the Third Convention as a prisoner
of war (or of the First or Second Conventions), he or she necessarily falls within
the ambit of Convention IV, provided that its article 4 requirements are satisfied.
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-2 1-T, Judgment, 271 (Nov. 16, 1998). In another case
before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, where the Court held that
GCIV is intended to protect persons with a perceived "allegiance" to the enemy and "who do not
have the nationality of the belligerent in whose hands they find themselves." Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-1-A, at 164, Judgment, 164 (July 15, 1999). In a different case, the ICTY added
that GCIV should be interpreted to protect civilians to the "maximum extent possible." Prosecutor
v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A 57, Judgment, 57 (Feb. 20, 2001).
155. See AR 190-8, supra note 21, 1-6e(10).
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THE COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL

A. HistoricalDevelopment - Hamdi & Rasul
This next section focuses on the Combatant Status Review Tribunals
which replaced the Article 5 tribunals in the GWOT. This section first
examines the historical development of the CSRT, beginning with the U.S.
Supreme Court rulings in Hamdi and Rasul, and then turns to the
development and eventual implementation of the CSRT procedures. The
section also examines the methods for reviewing the CSRT findings as
provided in the Administrative Review Board and the Detainee Treatment
Act. Finally, it examines comparative systems for determining prisoner
status, helpful in the Analysis section of Part IV.
Following the 9/11 attacks on New York City and the Pentagon,
President Bush told a joint session of Congress that evidence showed al
Qaeda was responsible for the attacks.5 6 During that speech, President
Bush demanded the Taliban turn over all leaders of al Qaeda, release all
foreign nationals including U.S. citizens who have been unjustly
imprisoned, and protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in
Afghanistan.' 57 The President also demanded the Taliban give the United
States full access to terrorist training camps and "hand over the terrorists
or they will share in their fate."' 8 These demands, the President asserted,
should be met immediately, and were non-negotiable. 159
Soon after the President's address, Congress passed the Authorization
for Use of Military Force resolution which authorized the President to use
"all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks ... in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism 16against
the United States by such nations, organizations or
0
persons.'

On October 7,2001 United States and British forces conducted targeted
military operations in Afghanistan, striking in particular airfields, air
defense systems, terrorist training camps and concentrations of Taliban

156. President George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001)
[hereinafter Bush's Address], http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001); see also note following 50 U.S.C.S. § 1541 (LexisNexis 2008).
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and al Qaeda personnel. 6 ' During the course of the military campaign,
U.S. and Northern Alliance forces captured alleged members of the
Taliban and al Qaeda. Initially held in Afghan prisons, many prisoners
were eventually transferred to the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. 62 On October 17, 2001, Central Command Commander General
Tommy Franks directed all troops under his command comply with the
laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions. 63 The Conventions, he
ordered, were to apply to all captured persons." General Franks ordered
that all belligerents be screened to determine prisoner of war status in
accordance with the procedures set out in AR 190_8.165
However, in Washington DC, Deputy Assistant Attorney General John
Yoo thought otherwise. In his memorandum dated January 9, 2002, Yoo
concluded that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to members of al
Qaeda or Taliban 66 because al Qaeda is not a "State" and not a signatory
to the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, Yoo claimed, the Conventions and
the protections afforded there under did not apply to al Qaeda. 167 He also
claimed the Conventions did not apply to the Taliban because Afghanistan
was a "failed state whose territory" was "overrun and
held by violence by
168
government."'
a
by
than
rather
faction
or
a militia
On January" 18, 2002, White House legal counsel Alberto R. Gonzales
concurred with the Yoo opinion and so advised the President. Later that
day, the White House announced neither members of al Qaeda or Taliban
would receive prisoner of war status. 169 Consistent with the new White
161. Dan Balz, U.S., BritainLaunchAirstrikesAgainst Targets in Afghanistan, WASH. POST,
Oct. 8, 2001.
162. John Mintz, On Detainees, U.S. Faces Legal Quandary,WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002.
163. REPORT OF INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DETENTION
OPERATIONS, AUGUST 2004 (SCHLESINGER REPORT), reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD
TO ABU GHRAIB, at 947 (Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE
TORTURE PAPERS].

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Memorandum from John Yoo for William J. Haynes II,
General Counsel, Department
of Defense, Re. Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9,2002)
[hereinafter Yoo Memo], reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 163, at 38-79. This

Memorandum was forwarded from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto Gonzales,
Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense,
Re. Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, (Jan. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter Bybee Memo], reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 163, at 81-117.
167. See Yoo Memo, reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 163, at 48, 50.
168. See Yoo Memo, reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 163, at 50.

169. See Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President for the President, Re.
Applic. of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Gonzales
Memo], reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 163, at 81-117.
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House policy, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld overruled General Franks'
previous order, and on January 22, 2002, directed that members of al
Qaeda and Taliban would not receive prisoner of war status, but instead
would be treated humanely "consistent with military necessity, [and] in a
manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of
1949.''170 Six days later, Gonzales forwarded his conclusions to the

President who subsequently announced that the Geneva Conventions
would not apply to members of either al Qaeda or Taliban. "'
Meanwhile, on January 25, 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell
lodged his objections to the policy with the White House. He believed the
United States should apply the Geneva Conventions for several reasons,
including its past reliance on the Conventions and that failure to comply
with the Conventions undermined U.S. military culture.' 72 By denying
prisoner of war status and ignoring the Conventions, other states could73
similarly deny status and application of the Conventions to U.S. forces. 1
According to Secretary Powell, the United States would pay "a high cost
in terms of negative international reaction., 17 4 He added that this change
in policy would "reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in
supporting the Geneva conventions and undermine the protections of the
' 75
law of war for our troops, both in this specific conflict and in general.'
On February 1, 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft advised the President
that the Geneva Conventions should not apply to the conflict in
Afghanistan for two reasons. 176 First, Attorney General Ashcroft stated
that Afghanistan was a failed state and the protections afforded it by the

170. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Subject: Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda (Jan. 29,2002) reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra
note 163, at 80.
171. See Gonzales Memo, reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 163, at 81-117.
172. Memorandum from Colin Powell, Secretary of State, for Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to
the President Subject, Draft Decision Memorandum on the Applicability ofthe Geneva Convention
to the Conflict in Afghanistan [hereinafter Powell Memo], reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS,
supra note 163, at 122-25.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 123.
175. Id. See also OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 39 (The Army has
provided several reasons for compliance with IHL, even though the enemy may not: compliance
ends the conflict sooner otherwise mistreatment encourages the enemy to fight and resist capture;
compliance enhances public support of the military mission; compliance encourages reciprocal
conduct from the enemy; compliance reduces waste of resources in combat and costs of
reconstruction; required by the law.).
176. Letter from Attorney General John Ashcroft to the President, George W. Bush Re.
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 1, 2002), reprintedin THE TORTURE
PAPERS, supra note 163.
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Geneva Conventions did not apply during the period of armed conflict.'
Second during the times Afghanistan was a party to the Geneva
Convention, al Qaeda and Taliban fighters did not follow the laws of
war.' As a result, he concluded that the prisoners did not qualify as
prisoners of war under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.179
Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee advised the President in a
second memorandum dated February 7, 2002, that the President may
"obviate the need for Article 5 tribunals" based on reasonable grounds
"that the Taliban, as a whole, is not legally entitled to POW status under
Articles 4(A)(1) through (3) [of GCIII]."'
Finally, on February 7, 2002, the President set out the policy regarding
the Geneva Conventions, to wit: (1) none of the Conventions would apply
to the conflict with al Qaeda since that organization is not a Party to the
Conventions; (2) although the President has the authority to suspend the
Conventions, he would not, but instead determined that the Conventions
would apply to the conflict with the Taliban; (3) Common Article 3 does
not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees since the conflict with
them is international in scope; and, (4) Taliban detainees are unlawful
combatants and therefore not entitled to prisoner of war status.'18 The
President also provided that since the Conventions did not apply to al
Qaeda, those detainees would not receive prisoner of war status.'82 In an
attempt to clarify the apparent policy conflict between applying the
Conventions yet denying prisoner of war status, the United States
contended that "detainees" receive many of the same privileges as
prisoners of war consistent with the principles of the Conventions.' 83

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Memorandum from Jay Bybee for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re:
Status of Taliban Forces under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 (Feb. 7, 2002)
[hereinafter Bybee Memo 2], reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 163, at 136-43.
181. Memorandum from the President of the United States for the Vice President et. al.,
Subject: Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Bush
Memo], reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 163, at 134-35.
182. Id. at 135.
183. The White House Fact Sheet, Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html (Four years later, following
the Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the United States changed course again and
admitted the GenevaConventions apply to both al Qaeda and Taliban.). Charles Babington &
Michael Abramowitz, U.S. Shifts Policy on Geneva Conventions, WASH. POST, July 21, 2006, at
A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/ 1/
AR2006071100094.html?referrer--email.
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Eventually, the prisoners held at GTMO were reclassified as
"detainees" so as not to be confused with prisoners of war.' 84 Because the
United States contended the Conventions did not apply because status was
never in doubt, no one at GTMO received an AR 190-8, or any
comparable process under GCII Article 5.185 This policy eventually
reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 2004.186
The Supreme Court in Hamdi ratified its earlier holding in Ex Parte
Quirin that "capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants" are
"important incident[s] of war."'187 The Court also held that a citizendetainee challenging his status as an enemy combatant was "entitled to a
fair opportunity to rebut' 88the Government's factual assertions before a
neutral decision maker.'
Issued the same day as Hamdi, the Court's opinion in Rasul held that
the Federal District Court had jurisdiction to hear a statutory writ of
habeas corpus challenge by alien-detainees held at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. 189 Relying on an interpretation of the habeas corpus statute, the
Court held that statutory habeas corpus drew no distinction between
Americans and aliens held in federal custody, and as such aliens may
90
invoke the Federal Court's jurisdiction under statutory habeas corpus.
Because of these distinctions, the Rasul Court ruled that Eisenstragerdid
not bar federal court jurisdiction over Rasul's habeas corpus claims.' 9 1
In response to these decisions, the Department of Defense eventually
created the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) intended to be
184. MARGUIES, supra note 10, at 267 n.3.

185. Corn et al., supra note 139, at 334.
186. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (quoting Ex ParteQuirin, 317 U.S. at 28).
187. Id.at518.
188. Id. at 526.
189. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). In reaching its decision, the Court considered its
prior holding in Johnson v. Eisenstrager,339 U.S. 763 (1950), where the writ of constitutional
habeas corpus was denied to 21 German citizens who had been captured by U.S. forces in China,
tried and convicted of war crimes by an American military commission headquartered in Nanking,
and incarcerated in the Landsberg Prison in occupied Germany. Id. at 475. In rendering its decision,
the Court ruled that the petitioners in Rasul differed from those in Eisenstragerbecause "[T]hey
are not nationals of countries at war with the United States, and they deny that they have engaged
in or plotted acts of aggression against the United States; they have never been afforded access to
any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years
they have been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction
and control." Id.at 476.
190. Id.at 480.
191. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484. Kermit Roosevelt, III, CurrentDebates in the Conflict of Laws:
Applicationof the Constitutionto GuantanamoBay: Guantanamoand the Conflict ofLaws: Rasul
and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017 (June 2005) (Roosevelt comments that the opinion seems
less satisfying as the Court avoided reversing Eisenstrageror announcing alien-detainees possessed
any constitutional rights.).
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"tribunals very much like those cited favorably by the Court to meet the
unique circumstances of the Guantanamo detainees," which would
"provide an expeditious opportunity for non-citizen detainees to receive
notice and opportunity to be heard."' 92 Providing some method of process
for the detainees, vis-A-vis the CSRT, addressed only part of the problem.
Prisoner release usually occurs in the JHL at the close of hostilities.
However, in the GWOT, release is much more problematic when there is
no telling how or when the war on terror would end. Prisoners could
theoretically be held indefinitely. In fact, President Bush's address to
Congress on September 20, 2001 said that the GWOT would be a long war
and that the war only "begins with al Qaeda ... It will not end until every
terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."' 9 3
In fact, the Supreme Court in Hamdi recognized that GWOT detainees
could theoretically be held
indefinitely according to IHL standards, but it
194
left the issue unresolved.
B. The CSRT Procedures
Following the decisions in Hamdi and Rasul, the Department of
Defense quickly moved to establish procedures for determining prisoner
status in the GWOT. 1 95 The CSRT procedures were initially established in
a four page Order by Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy from the
Deputy Secretary of Defense Order dated July 7, 2004.196 The Order
provided that all detainees should have "the opportunity to contest [their]
designation as an enemy combatant."' 97 A July 14, 2006 memorandum
from Deputy Secretary of Defense explains that the "purpose and
function" of the CSRT is to provide a "non-adversarial proceeding to
determine whether ... the preponderance of the evidence supports the
conclusion that each detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an
'
enemy combatant."198
It also included thirteen points of procedure
192. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FACT SHEET, COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNALS
[hereinafter DOD FACT SHEET], http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707factsheet.
pdf.
193. Bush's Address, supra note 156.
194. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520-21.
195. Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense for the Secretary of the Navy, Subject:
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004) [hereinafter ORDER],
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/ d2004O7O7review.pdf.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense for Secretaries of the Military
Departments Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (July 14,
2006) [hereinafter CSRT PROCEDURES], http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809
CSRTProcedures.pdf.
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covering approximately one page of the memorandum.'99 The procedures
were supposed to be based loosely on AR 190-8.200 The Order also
included a definition for "enemy combatant. ' 21 1 This same definition was
eventually incorporated into the final procedures two years later on July
14, 2006.202
The CSRT procedures were intended to create a streamlined
proceeding before a tribunal of three commissioned military officers who
determine prisoner status by a majority vote. 20 3 The procedures address
such matters as the requirement for an oath, the keeping of a record, open
proceedings, and the prohibition on compulsion to testify. 2 4 Evidence is
admitted if it is probative. 2 5 The rules of evidence do not necessarily
apply.20 6 Instead, the government's evidence is presumed "genuine and
accurate. 207 The government must present all relevant evidence, including
any evidence that may negate the detainee's designation as an enemy
combatant.20 8 Any statements derived from coercion must be determined
by the tribunal for probative value. 2 9 Although the detainee's personal
representative (who does not represent the detainee, but merely serves as
a liaison with the Tribunal) may view and comment on classified
documents, he may not share that information with the detainee.210 Instead,
21 ' The tribunal
unclassified summaries may be provided to the detainee.
2 12
evidence.
of
makes a finding based on a preponderance
Under the CSRT, the government provides the detainee with the
assistance of a personal representative (who is not a judge advocate), an
interpreter, if necessary, an opportunity to review unclassified information
relating to the basis for detention, the opportunity to appear personally to
present reasonably available information relevant as to why he should not
be classified as an enemy combatant, the opportunity to question witnesses
testifying at the tribunal (to the extent that they are reasonably available),

199. ORDER, supra note 195.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

DOD FACT SHEET, supra note 192.
ORDER, supranote 195, at 1.
CSRT PROCEDURES, supra note 198, enclosure 1.
Id. enclosure 1, at 1.
Id. enclosure 1, at 2.
Id. enclosure 1, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. enclosure 1, at 7.
Id. at 2.
Id. enclosure 3, at 2.
Id. enclosure 1, at4.
Id. enclosure 1, at 6.
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and the opportunity to call witnesses on his behalf.213 If a detainee is
determined by the CSRT tribunal not to be an enemy combatant, the
Secretary of State is supposed to coordinate the release of the detainee. 2 4
Finally, and of significant note, the CSRT may make only one
25
determination: whether or not the detainee is an "enemy combatant.,

,

status. 216

"Enemy
The tribunal has no other authority but to decide
combatant" is defined in the CSRT as anyone who was "part of or
supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.
This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has
directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces."2 7
C. Methods of Review
1. Administrative Review Board Procedures
At the same time the CSRT Procedures were released, the Department
of Defense released the Administrative Review Board (ARB) procedures
which are used to "determine annually if enemy combatants detained by
the Department of Defense at ... Guantanamo.
218
transferred, or continue to be detained.,

.

. should be released,

The ARB is not required by the Conventions. When the ARB was
released, the Department of Defense commented "there's no precedent for
this type of process. This is a process we instituted to assess whether an
enemy combatant continues to pose a threat to our country or to our allies
or whether there's other factors that might be reasons for continued
'
detention."219
As of December 11, 2007, the Department of Defense has twice
reviewed the status of detainees by ARB process. 220 The first round was
213. Id. enclosure 3, at 3.
214. Id. enclosure 1, at 9.
215. Id. enclosure 1, at 1.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. The same day the CSRT Procedures were issued, Undersecretary England issued a
memorandum, which established annual administrative review procedures to determine enemy
combatant status for those held by the DOD at the Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (July 14, 2006) [hereinafter ARB PROCEDURES),
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/ d20060809ARBProceduresMemo.pdf.
219. Secretary of Navy Gordon England Briefing (Dec. 20, 2004), http://www.defenselink.
mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2043. In fact, AR 190-8 does not discuss appeal rights.
220. News Release, Department of Defense, Guantanamo Bay Detainee Administrative
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conducted between December 14, 2004 and December 23, 2005 where
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon R. England, the "Designated Civilian
Official" for the ARB process, made 463 board recommendations resulting
in 14 releases, 120 transfers, and 329 continued detentions. 22' The second
round was conducted from January 30, 2006 to December 6, 2006 where
Deputy England made final decisions on all 328 board recommendations
consisting of 55 transfers and 273 continued detentions.222 As a matter of
practice, those who had been22 3 identified for trial by a military commission
would not receive an ARB.
2. The Detainee Treatment Act and Military Commission Act
On December 30, 2005, President Bush signed into law the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA).224 The DTA eliminates the Federal Courts'
jurisdiction over all habeas claims by aliens detained at Guantanamo
Bay. 225 It provides a limited means for appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit to "determine the validity of any final
decision of a Combatant Status Review
Tribunal that an alien is properly
226
detained as an enemy combatant.,
The DTA also provides detainees with a means to appeal their status
as enemy combatants.227 However, the grounds for appeal are limited to
considering whether the determination made by the "Designated Civilian
Official" was consistent with the applicable DOD procedures, including
Review Board Decisions Completed (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.
aspx?releaseid=9302; News Release, Department of Defense, Guantanamo Bay Detainee
Administrative Review Board Decisions Completed (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.defenselink.mil/
Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaselD=-10582 [hereinafter News Release, Guantanamo Bay Detainee
Administrative Review Board Decisions Completed (Mar. 6, 2007)].
221. News Release, Department of Defense, Guantanamo Bay Detainee Administrative
Review Board Decisions Completed (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.
aspx?releaseid=9302.
222. News Release, Guantanamo Bay Detainee Administrative Review Board Decisions
Completed (Mar. 6, 2007), supra note 220.
223. News Release, Department of Defense, Guantanamo Bay Detainee Administrative
Review Results Announced (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?
ReleaselD=10582.Abdul Zahir never received an ARB because he had once been designated for
trial before a military commission. He may never receive an ARB regardless if he is ever charged.
224. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(e)(2)(A), Pub. L. 109-148 [hereinafter DTA],
available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/gazette/2005/12/detainee-treatment-act-of-2005-white.php.
The elimination of habeas corpus to detainees by the DTA was recently litigated on December 5,
2007, before the U.S. Supreme Court in the consolidated matters ofBoumediene v. Bush (06-1195)
and Al Odah v. United States (06-1196).
225. Id. § 1005(e)(l).
226. Id. § 1005(e)(2)(A).
227. Id.§ 1005(e)(2)(c)(i).
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whether the decision was supported by a preponderance of the evidence
(allowing for the rebuttable presumption in favor of the governments
evidence).228 Detainees may also appeal on the grounds that "to the extent
the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable, whether the
use of such standards and procedures to make the determination is
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. 22 9
After the U.S. Supreme Court struck the previous version of the
military commission in Hamdan, the President signed into law the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).2 3 ° The MCA expands the DTA by
making CSRT review the detainee's exclusive remedy. 2 11 Essentially, the
Court's habeas
MCA reinforces the DTA provision revoking the Federal
23 2
jurisdiction over alien combatants in U.S. custody.
Under the MCA, the military commissions have personal jurisdiction
over aliens determined to be unlawful enemy combatants.233 An unlawful
enemy combatant is "a person who, before, on, or after the date of the
enactment of [the MCA], has been determined to be an unlawful enemy
combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal., 234 An unlawful
enemy combatant is also a person who has engaged in "hostilities or who
has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United
States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant
(including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated
forces).,235 However, the CSRT may only determine whether or not the
prisoner is an "enemy combatant," and not whether he is an "unlawful
enemy combatant."

228. Id. § 1005(a)(2).
229. See id.§ 1005(e)(2)(c)(ii).
230. Review and analysis of the Military Commission Act of 2006 or the subsequent Rules
for Military Commissions is beyond the scope of this Article. See Military Commissions Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366 (2006) [hereinafter MCA].
231. Id. § 10.
232. Id. § 7.
233. Id. § 948d(a).
234. Id.§ 948(a)(1) (emphasis added).
235. Id.Subsequent to the submission of this article, the Supreme Court ruled in Boumediene
v. Bush that aliens held at GTMO and designated as enemy combatants have the constitutional
privilege of habeas corpus. The Court also ruled that § 7 of the MCA limited judicial review of a
detainee's status as an enemy combatant through the DTA was not an adequate substitute for
habeas.Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008). The Court noted that it made "no judgment
as to whether the CSRTs, as currently constituted, satisfy due process standards," and emphasized
that "both the DTA and the CSRT process remain intact." Id.at 2275.
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D. ComparativeAnalysis
Prior to 9/11, many U.S. allies had adopted procedures for determining
status of prisoners captured during armed conflict. This part reviews
procedures of a select few U.S. allies in the GWOT.
1. Canadian Approach
Canada's regulations for determining prisoner status in armed conflict
directs unit commanders initially to screen prisoners for determining
prisoner of war status.236 If the Commanding Officer doubts a prisoner's
status as a prisoner of war, then he may direct a tribunal to determine such
status. 23 7 The reasons for doubt must be part of the record requesting a
tribunal. 23 8 This information is then forwarded to a higher authority
(Minister of Defense, Chief of Defense Staff, a commanding officer of a
command or formation, or any authority directed by the Chief of Defense
Staff) who then reviews the information and determines whether there is
doubt as to status.2 39 If that authority questions the status, then a tribunal
is convened.2 4 °
The tribunal consists of one officer who is a member of the Legal
Branch of Canadian Forces. 241' The Tribunal may order witnesses to appear
and order evidence be produced. 24 2 The prisoner has the right to
representation (but not necessarily by an attorney), who helps prepare for
the hearing, represent the prisoner during the hearing, assist in preparing
any written representations, and to present evidence. 24 3 The prisoner has
the right to an interpreter, and the right to a determination within 24
hours. 2' The tribunal may take evidence in camera if the interests of
national security so require.2 41 The prisoner may be given a non-classified
summary if national security would not be affected. 246 Relevant evidence
may be admitted without regard to whether it tends to prove or disprove
236.

SOR/91-134, DEPARTMENT
art. 7 (Feb. 1, 1991), availableat http://www.canlii.org/ca/regu/sor9l-134/.

PRISONER OF WAR STATUS DETERMINATION REGULATIONS,

OF JUSTICE CANADA,

237. Id. art. 8.
238. Id. art. 8(2).
239. Id. arts. 8(3) & 3.
240. Id. art. 8.
241. Id. art. 4.
242. Id. arts. 6 & 17.
243. Id. art. 10.
244. Yasnin Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-of-WarStatus, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS, 571, 589
(Sept. 2002), http://www.icrc.orgfWeb/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/5FLBZK/$File/irrc 847 Naqvi.
pdf.
245. PRISONER OF WAR STATUS DETERMINATION REGULATIONS, supra note 236, art. 15.
246. Id.
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status.2 47 The tribunal renders a determination if the "evidence establishes
on a balance of probabilities that the detainee is not entitled to prisoner-ofwar status. 248
Unlike in the U.S. procedures for AR 190-8, the detainee is entitled to
a limited review of the tribunal finding.249 However, the review is made by
the Commanding Officer with custody over the detainee.
2. UK Approach
Prisoner of war status hearings in the United Kingdom are guided by
three sources: (i) Prisoner of War Determination of Status Regulations
(1958);25 (ii) S.135 Army Act of 1955;252 and, (iii) Boards of Inquiry

(Army) Rules, 1956.253 In the United Kingdom, if there is any doubt as to
status, prisoners are deemed prisoners of war until such status is clarified
by a hearing.254
At the hearing, the board may receive any evidence it considers
relevant, whether it be written or oral and regardless of whether it would
be admissible in civil court.255
Like AR 190-8, witnesses are examined under oath,256 and the
proceedings are recorded in writing and with detail sufficient to enable an
authority to follow the proceedings.2 5 7 There is no reference to legal
representation or rights of review.
Although status may not be contested, a board may still be convened
when questions arise as to status. In fact, during the First Gulf War, 35
Iraqis claimed they were not members of the Iraqi armed forces and were
not alleged to have committed hostile acts, yet a board of inquiry was
convened because the commander doubted their status.258

247. Id. art. 13.
248. Id. The standard of proof requiring a detainee to show he is not entitled to POW status
indicates that a lesser burden may be needed to show POW status. Naqvi, supra note 244, at 589.
249. PRISONER OF WAR STATUS DETERMINATION REGULATIONS, supra note 236, art. 17.
250. Id.
251. PRISONER OF WAR DETERMINATION OF STATUS REGULATIONS,
1 (1958),
http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/6fa4d35e5e3025394125673e00508143/c5ccc00a3c05ea6ecl 256ba
000374115!OpenDocument.
252. Army Act, 1955, c. 18, § 135 (U.K.).
253. Board of Inquiry (Army) Rules, 1956, S.I. 1956/630 (U.K.), availableathttp://geocities.
com/aspals legal_pages/boi.pdf.
254. PRISONER OF WAR DETERMINATION OF STATUS REGULATIONS, supra note 236, 1.
255. Board of Inquiry (Army) Rules, supranote 253, 112.
256. Id. 15.
257. Id.
258. Naqvi, supra note 244, at 588.
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3. Israeli Approach
Israel's Article 5 procedures are found in the "Incarceration of
Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002" and are intended to regulate "the
incarceration of unlawful combatants not entitled to prisoner-of-war
status. 2 59 Unlike AR 190-8, the Israeli approach incorporates the term
"combatant" and distinguishes the lawful combatant, or "prisoner," from
"unlawful combatant. 2 60
For Israel, an "unlawful combatant" is:
a person who has participated either directly or indirectly in hostile
acts against the State of Israel or is a member of a force
perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel, where the
conditions prescribed in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention
of 12th August 1949 with respect to prisoners-of-war and granting
prisoner-of-war status in international humanitarian law, do not
apply to him.26'
Under the Israeli approach, if the Chief of General Staff has reasonable
cause to believe that someone is an unlawful combatant and that his
release will harm State security, then he may order the person
incarcerated.262 The prisoner is entitled to be notified of the 26
reasons
for
3
detention as soon as possible and may make a formal protest.
Unlike AR 190-8, the Israeli system allows for civilian judicial review
within 14 days of the initial incarceration order.2" Failure to comply with
the procedures to this point is cause to quash the incarceration order. 265 A
civilian District Court will review the incarceration decision initially and
then every six months thereafter to ensure release will not harm the
State.2666 7 Decisions by the civilian court may be appealed to the Supreme
2
Court.

Like AR 190-8, the procedural rules are relaxed at the District Court
level. The rules of evidence do not apply and evidence may be withheld
259.

LAW 5762-2002 § 1 [hereinafter
available at http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/
rdonlyres/7E86D098-0463-4F37-A38D-8AEBE77OBDE6/0/IncarcerationLaweditedl4O302.doc.
260. Id.§ 2.
261. Id.
262. Id. § 3(a).
263. Id.§ 3(c).
264. Id. § 5(a).
265. INCARCERATION OF UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS LAW, supra note 259, § 6.
266. Id.§ 5(c).
267. Id. § 5(d).
INCARCERATION OF UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS

INCARCERATION OF UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS LAW],
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26 9
if disclosure would harm State security. 268 The hearings are in camera.
But unlike AR 190-8, the prisoner is entitled to legal counsel.27 °
There is a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government that
release of members of a particular force (which are engaged in hostilities
against the State) would cause harm to State security. 27 ' Finally, and
consistent with the IHL, the Israeli model anticipates criminal prosecution
against unlawful combatants.272

IV. ANALYSIS

Like many decisions made by the United States during the GWOT, the
CSRT has generated an impassioned level of critical discourse over the
applicability of Article 5 verses the legality of the CSRT. This section is
not intended to persuade the reader towards any one position. Rather, it is
intended to briefly summarize the basic claims made by proponents (and
critics) for each system, and let the reader decide for himself which is most
persuasive. Regardless of which side the reader takes, it is anticipated the
reader will concede that each side makes compelling arguments. Because
they do, neither Article 5 nor the CSRT may be the best systems for
determining prisoner status in the GWOT, and therefore a different model
approach is needed.
A. Introduction
Before September 11, 2001, terrorists were prosecuted as ordinary
criminals. 273 But the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
changed the way America views terrorism and terrorists. Before 9/11,
terrorism was considered a law enforcement issue, and terrorists as
criminals. 4 Since then, terrorism abroad is considered a military matter
and terrorists as enemy combatants to be detained as such or prosecuted
before military commissions.275

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. § 5(e).
Id. § 5(t).
Id § 6.
Id. 7 & 8.
Id. 9.
See Peal, supra note 29, at 1668.

274.

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, FINAL

9/11 REPORT, supra note 3, at 73 ("Legal processes were the primary method for
responding to these early manifestations of a new type of terrorism.").
275. MCA, supra note 230; MARGULIES, supra note 10, at 267 n.3.
REPORT,
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Before 9/11, combatants captured in international armed conflict were
27 6
entitled under IHL to an Article 5 tribunal to determine prisoner status.
Since then the lines amongst civilians, combatants and criminals have
become blurred so now combatants receive a CSRT to determine whether
the prisoner is an enemy combatant.277
Although the CSRT and the AR 190-8 procedures may look alike, the
purposes and the permitted tribunal findings differ. Advocates of the
CSRT claim IHL and the Conventions do not apply in the GWOT. In the
alternative they claim the CSRT is the best means for determining status
of prisoners captured in the GWOT while complying with international
legal norms. Opponents to the CSRT claim otherwise. They argue that IHL
and the Conventions apply and that the CSRT is a poor alternative for
determining prisoner status in the GWOT.
Through academic writings and other sources, this section reviews the
positions taken and arguments made by proponents (and critics) for each
side of the debate. For reasons that should become clear, both sides make
compelling cases why their preferred system is correct and the other is not.
Yet both systems are flawed and neither may be the right system for
resolving prisoner status particularly when considering due process
concerns, appeals, and an objective means for determining release of
combatants who are not prosecuted. Therefore, a different system or model
is needed; one that incorporates pre-existing lHL and practices but is
modified accordingly for the GWOT to provide for the principle reasons
prisoners are detained in the GWOT. Those principle reasons for detaining
prisoners in the GWOT, as articulated by the United States, are as follows:
(1) to identify and prevent those individuals from returning to the
"battlefield,, 278 (2) to identify and detain those individuals for
interrogation and intelligence, 279 and (3) to identify and detain those
individuals for criminal prosecution before a military commission or
domestic court.28 °
As to the first reason for detention in the GWOT, just as in IHL,
captured enemies are detained to keep them from returning to the
battlefield. By doing so, the detaining power and its soldiers are protected
276. See FM 27-10, supra note 116.
277. See CSRT PROCEDURES, supra note 198.
278. BOB WOODWARD, STATE OF DENIAL 486-87 (2006) (In reference to those held at
Guantanamo Bay following the Supreme Court decision in Hamdan, Bob Woodward writes,
"Rumsfeld felt they should be interrogated and kept in detention to keep them off the battlefield.").
279. The Supreme Court has recognized that detainees may not be subject to indefinite
detention for purposes of interrogation. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520-21 (2004).
280. See William Glaberson, CourtAdvances Military TrialsforDetainees,N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
25, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/25/washington/25gitmo.html?_r=l&
adxnnl= 1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1 190749600-3dvjLrfvbGElQsPMtH2zCw.
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from further attack by the captured enemy. 281' The detention usually lasts
a definitive term, or at least until hostilities end, at which point prisoner
release is negotiated between the warring states. Once active hostilities
end, prisoners should "be released and repatriated without delay., 28 2 In the
GWOT however, the reasons for detaining combatants is the same as in
IHL except for one key difference: no one can say for certain when
hostilities will end, and if they do end, with whom should the United
States negotiate prisoner release. Negotiations for prisoner exchanges
could be particularly difficult when no states, per se, are parties to the
GWOT. Even if the United States could or would negotiate with al Qaeda
or any other terrorist organization, the GWOT is distinct from traditional
armed conflict because it is a conceptual conflict with terrorism which in
and of itself may never end, potentially lasting in perpetuity as new
organizations replace former organizations.283 Just as the Supreme Court
noted in Hamdi, the Government may "not consider this unconventional
war won for two generations... (and so) Hamdi's detention could last for
the rest of his life...,,28 4 The potential for indefinite detention in a conflict
such as the GWOT is not addressed by the Conventions, and so for this
reason, amongst others, Article 5 and the AR 190-8 procedure is flawed.
But unlike Article 5, the CSRT process provides a review process
through the ARB. However, for reasons discussed later, the CSRT/ARB
system remains flawed for its failure to provide sufficient due process.
The second reason for detention in the GWOT is for intelligence
collection vis-A-vis interrogation. At GTMO, Government interrogators
systematically questioned detainees for military intelligence.285
Intelligence analysts used this information to assimilate data from
hundreds of sessions.286 Based on the connections or relationships,
intelligence analysts supposedly distinguished which prisoner was al

281. Yin, supranote 106, at 166 n.76 (citingln re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946));
see also FM 27-10, supra note 116, 198.
282. See GCIII, supra note 20, art. 118.
283. Joseph Blocher, Combatant Status Review Tribunals: Flawed Answers to the Wrong
Question, 116 YALE L.J. 667, 670 (2006).
284. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520-21.
285. ROBERT POPP & JOHN POINDEXTER, COUNTERING TERRORISM THROUGH INFORMATION
AND PRIVACY PROTECTION TECHNOLOGIES, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Vol. 4, no. 6, 18-27

(Nov./Dec. 2006), available at http://www.computer.org/portal/site/security/menuitem.
6f7b2414551 cb8465 1286b 108bcd45 f3/index.j sp?&pName=securitylevel Iarticle
&TheCat=- 01 5&path=security/2006/v4n6&file=popp.xml&.
286. Id.
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Qaeda or which was Taliban. 2 7 However, the Conventions prohibit
prolonged detention for this purpose, 2s8 and for this reason the
Conventions and Article 5 could not apply to the GWOT.
The third reason for detention is to identify those who will be
prosecuted before a military commission. Neither Article 5 nor AR 190-8
consider a process comparable to an indictment which provides defendants
with minimum due process guaranteed under the Conventions, ICCPR and
other LHL. The CSRT similarly fails in this regard. In fact, this issue was
raised in the CMCR matter of United States v. Khadr where the court
commented that at the time each detainee was given a CSRT, the MCA
had not been drafted and so no detainee could have possibly known that
a determination as an enemy combatant determination could possibly
subject them to criminal prosecution before a military commission. 289 The
CMCR agreed that designation as an enemy combatant is insufficient to
provide jurisdiction in a military commission.29 °
In sum, neither the Article 5 tribunal nor the CSRT are sufficient for
determining prisoner status in the GWOT. For Common Article 3 conflicts
(such as in Afghanistan since June 2002 and in the GWOT against al
Qaeda elsewhere), Article 5 tribunals are not required under the
Conventions.2 9 1 But even if Common Article 2 were to apply to the
GWOT, Article 5 still does not resolve these critical issues relevant to
287. Id; see also Ellen Nakashima & Alec Klein, New ProfilingProgramRaises Privacy
Concerns, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/27/AR2007022701542.html.
288. See Jinks, supra note 102, at 380; see also GCIII, supra note 20, art. 17.
289. United States v. Khadr, No. CMCR07-001 (C.M.C.R. Sept. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.scotusblog.coml movabletype/archives/CMCR%20ruling/209-24-07.pdf. The Court
stated:
We need not speculate how Mr. Khadr's personal participation in his 2004 CSRT
evaluation may have been impacted had he been on notice of the potential
criminal liability the CSRTs finding could impose upon him. Such lack of notice
offends our most basic and fundamental notions of due process; therefore, it also
violates Common Article 3.
Id. at 15. Khadr claimed the military commission lacked jurisdiction over him since jurisdiction in
the MCA is over anyone who has been determined to be an "unlawful enemy combatant" as
determined by the CSRT. Yet, the CSRT cannot make such a determination, and never did. The
CSRT could only determine whether Khadr was an "enemy combatant" and not an "unlawful
enemy combatant." These are two distinct things. The CMCR agreed on this point.
290. Id.
291. See ICRC Paper, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism: Questions and
Answers (May 5, 2004), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5YNLEV [hereinafter
ICRC Paper]; GCIII, supra note 20, art. 3. GCIII, supra note 20, art. 5. See generally Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. _ (quoting Common Article 3).
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prisoner release. Without some means for release, identification as a
combatant in the GWOT could subject the prisoner to a life sentence. Such
serious consequences are starker when considering that status
determinations under AR 190-8 are determined without the assistance of
legal counsel, by military officers with little or no legal experience, based
on evidence presumed reliable admitted by a preponderance standard.
Status is decided by a simple majority of the tribunal, whose decisions are
not subject to review. Likewise, the CSRT fails to provide sufficient due
process and therefore fails its initial task for identifying the correct status.
Failing this criterion, there is no reliability that the CSRT panel correctly
distinguished the innocent civilian from the unlawful combatant. Because
the CSRT only allows one finding that is based on unreliable evidence,
presumed reliable, and in most instances can never be examined, the
CSRT is fundamentally flawed. Therefore, a different system is needed.
B. Analysis and Critique of the Article 5 and the CSRT
1. Arguments For and Against Application of the Geneva Conventions
a. Whether the GWOT is the Right Kind of Conflict
Before determining whether a prisoner is entitled to an Article 5
tribunal, two questions must first be answered: (1) whether this is the right
kind of conflict and if so, (2) whether this prisoner is the right kind of
person.292 In this section, the first question to address is whether the
GWOT is the "Right Kind of Conflict" to which the Conventions apply.
Focusing on Afghanistan as the situs of the GWOT conflict for the
moment, 293 let us agree that the conflict with the Taliban and with al Qaeda
is an "armed conflict" particularly when considering the intensity of the
hostilities and the capacity and willingness of al Qaeda to coordinate
sustained hostilities.294
In addition to the armed conflict element, the methodology requires an
inquiry into whether the conflict is international or internal in character.
As to whether the GWOT itself is international (and thus one that qualifies
292. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 25.
293. Though some consider military operations in Iraq as part of the GWOT, most do not, and
as such, Iraq is not considered part of the GWOT for this Article. For anyone captured outside
Afghanistan or Iraq, Common Article 2 would not apply since Article 5 does not apply in such
conflicts. Peal, supra note 29, at 1643. But the underlying issue for this Article remains as to what
process is available for determining prisoner status.
294. Jinks, supra note 29, at 187.
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for Common Article 2 considerations) or internal (and is thereby limited
to Common Article 3 consideration), legal scholars have split.
One perspective includes those who support the U.S. position that the
GWOT is not a Common Article 2 conflict regarding al Qaeda because
"non-governmental organizations cannot be parties to any of the
' This is the
international agreements here governing the laws of war."295
position the President took when he denied status and Common Article 3
to conflict with al Qaeda.29 6 As to the GWOT conflict with the Taliban, the
United States initially claimed that this conflict was not covered by
Common Article 2 or 3 and thus the Conventions did not apply because
Afghanistan was a failed State,297 and as such, the President
constitutionally suspended U.S. obligations under the Conventions because
Afghanistan had no operating government capable of fulfilling its
international obligations.298 However, this position changed following the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hamdan which declared that Common
Article 3 protections will apply at a minimum to the conflict with al
Qaeda. The United States soon chose to apply the Conventions to the
Taliban and to al Qaeda.299 A third perspective views the conflict in
Afghanistan as mixed: it is partly international as between the United
States and
Taliban and partly internal as between the United States and al
300
Qaeda.
The ICRC takes a different position in support of application of
Common Article 2 protections to the conflict in Afghanistan. According
295. Bybee Memo, supra note 166, at 89-90.
296. Bush Memo, supra note 181, at 134-35.
297. The "failed state" argument collapses since the Taliban effectively controlled
Afghanistan, and was at the time the effective government. Afghanistan could arguably be deemed
an international armed conflict when a State Party is invaded by another State Party, even if a de
facto government rules the invaded State. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244-45 (2d Cir.
1995) ("[A] state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the
control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal
relations with other such entities..."); see also MURPHY, supra note 29, at 35-36. The fact that
the Taliban controlled 90% of the territory in Afghanistan, but were not politically recognized by
most of the international community, does not erode the privileges of the combatants or the
application of the IHL. DINsTEIN, supra note 30, at 47.
298. Whether and to what extent this position is correct, will not be addressed in this Article.
See Bybee Memo, supra note 166, at 90-91, & 95-111.
299. Babington & Abramowitz, supra note 183.
300. Armed conflict may incorporate elements of both international and non-international
elements and may occur simultaneously such as in Afghanistan where before U.S. intervention, the
Taliban were engaged in internal armed conflict with the Northern Alliance, yet remained so
engaged, even after the United States intervened against the Taliban. In this instance, the conflicts
did not merge, but rather the hostilities continued on two different planes: one was noninternational between Taliban and the Northern Alliance, and the other was international between
the United States and the Taliban. DINSTEIN, supranote 30, at 15.
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to the ICRC, the U.S. conflict in Afghanistan was initially one to which
Common Article 2 applied."0 As such, every combatant, whether Taliban
or al Qaeda, would receive the full protection of the Conventions as an
international armed conflict. Contrary to the U.S. position, it need not
matter whether al Qaeda was a signatory or a State for the purposes of the
Conventions. Its members would still receive the protections of Common
Article 2 (but not necessarily GCLI, discussed later). But after June 2002
when the Loya Jirga appointed Hamid Karzai head of the transitional
government, the nature of the conflict changed to one which Common
Article 3 applied.0 2 From this point forward, combatants should have been
entitled, just as the Supreme Court opined in Hamdan, to the minimal
protections of Common Article 333
As one could see, such disparity could lead to disproportionate results
for managing prisoners depending upon where or when the prisoner was
captured. As a result, two sets of norms could apply to the GWOT
depending on whether the armed conflict occurred in Afghanistan before
or after June 2002, or occurred against al Qaeda in some other sovereign.
In those instances of internal armed conflict governed by Common Article
3, Article 5 tribunals are not required, and as such, no process is mandated
under the Conventions for determining prisoner status during internal
armed conflict.
b. Whether the GWOT Detainees are the Right Kind of Persons
The second part of the Judge Advocate methodology, whether the
GWOT detainees are the "Right Kind of Person," may not be necessary
because, if Common Article 3 applies to the GWOT in Afghanistan after
June 2002, Article 5 tribunals are not required by the Conventions.
Logically, and consistent with IHL, in particular the ICCPR, some form
of process should still be provided to determine status.
Nevertheless, to best follow the intellectual discourse that eventually
led to the eventual implementation of the CSRT following Rasul and
Hamdi, this part continues the analysis by examining whether the
Conventions apply to members of the Taliban and al Qaeda as the "Right
Kind of Persons."

301. See ICRC Paper, supra note 291.
302. Id.
303. See id. Whether or not the GWOT is a Common Article 2 conflict is outside the scope
of this Article.
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(1) The Taliban
On the one hand, those proponents supporting the U.S. position claim
the Taliban do not qualify as prisoners of war because they failed to
comply with the rules of law and had aligned themselves with a terrorist
organization. 3°4 By doing so, the Taliban were like a terrorist organization
and therefore should not be considered prisoners of war.3"5 Besides, they
claim, the Taliban failed to comply with the requirements for GCIII,
Article 4 for collectively failing to wear uniforms or display fixed or
distinctive emblems.3 °6 It was for this failure to comply with Article 4 that
President Bush declared no Taliban would be considered a prisoner of
war. 307
On the other hand, a compelling argument has been made that captured
Taliban should not be denied prisoner of war status for failing to wear
uniforms.3" 8 Although the argument could be based on API Article 44,
which does not require the wearing of uniforms, neither the United States
nor Afghanistan ratified that Protocol.30 9 Instead, those maintaining the
Taliban as prisoners of war argue that Article 4 (A)(2) only applies to
militias and other volunteer corps and not to members of the armed
forces.310 The Taliban fighters, they claim, represented the Afghan
government prior to June 2002 and as such represent the Afghan armed

304. See Bybee Memo, supra note 166, at 90-91 & 95-111.
305. See id.
306. See Bybee Memo 2, supra note 180, at 136-43;seealso Bybee Memo, supra note 166,
at 83.
307. Bybee Memo 2, supranote 180, at 136-43;see also Bybee Memo, supra note 166, at 83.
For a summation of the U.S. position, see Joseph P. Bialke, AI-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful
CombatantDetainees, Unlawful Belligerency, and the InternationalLaws ofArmed Conflict, 55
A.F.L. REv. 1, 17-35 (2004) (conceding that the Taliban were the de facto government of
Afghanistan, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. Bialke makes the point, nonetheless, that the
Taliban are not entitled to POW status. Going into great detail, Lt. Col. Bialke denies status to
Taliban, en masse, because they failed to comply with Article 4 criteria. Failure of any of the four
(A)(2) criteria is reason enough, Biakle claims, to deny POW status. He details the atrocities
committed by al Qaeda with Taliban acquiescence claiming that as a result of their relationship, the
Taliban allowed al Qaeda to act as a de facto extension of the Taliban government so the Taliban
are vicariously liable for the acts of al Qaeda).
308. See G.H. Aldrich, The Taliban,al Qaeda,and the Determinationoffllegal Combatants,
96 AM. J. INT'L L. 891 (2002). For a more detailed analysis of this issue regarding the requirement
for uniforms, see Toni Pfanner, Military Uniforms and the Law of War, 86 IRRC 93 (2004),
availableathttp://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/5ZBE5X/$File/IRRC 853_Pfanner.
pdf. See also W. Hays Parks, SpecialForces' Wear of the Non-StandardUniforms, 4 CHfi. J. INT'L
L. 493 (2003).
309. Bialke, supra note 307, at 26-27, 29.
310. Aldrich, supra note 308, at 894.
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forces that are not required to wear uniforms.311 Support for this argument
can be found by comparison with U.S. Special Forces during the early
days of the GWOT when those regular U.S. forces fought alongside the
Northern Alliance dressed as local tribesman wearing no distinctive sign
or insignia, thus failing the uniform criteria of Article 4312 Besides, neither
Taliban fighters nor Northern Alliance fighters wore uniforms.313 As such,
both groups failed the distinctive sign criteria and thus neither group
should qualify for prisoner of war status. Failing to wear uniforms or a
distinctive emblem by both groups was not intended to disguise
themselves amongst the civilian populous, and commit perfidy, but rather
because they lacked supplies. 14 An alterative position claims that Taliban
may qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 (A)(1) as members of the
militia or voluntary corps because that section is independent of (A)(2)."i '
However, there may be a consensus that all four criteria must apply,
including to members
of the regular armed forces, but this issue remains
3 16
subject to debate.
(2) al Qaeda
In addition to the Taliban, proponents supporting the U.S. position
against application of the Conventions in the GWOT claim the
Conventions should not apply to al Qaeda because its members
collectively failed to distinguish themselves from the civilian population
and failed to comply with the laws of war by attacking civilian targets,
hijacking civilian planes, taking hostages and killing hostages. 7 These
were, in fact, the determinative reasons al Qaeda was denied prisoner of
war status.318
On the other hand, those advocating for application of the Conventions
to the GWOT submit that al Qaeda are entitled to prisoner of war status

311. Id.
312. See Aldrich, supra note 308; Pfanner, supra note 308, at 93; see also Parks, supra note
308.
313. See Aldrich, supra note 308; Pfanner, supra note 308, at 93; see also Parks,supra note
308.
314. See Aryeh Neier, The Military Tribunals on Trial,N.Y. TIMES REV. OF BooKs (2002),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15122.
315. Michael Petrusic, Enemy Combatantsin the War on Terror andthe Implicationsfor the
US. Armed Forces, 85 N.C. L. REV. 636, 656 (2007).
316. Id.; see also Eric Talbot Jensen, CombatantStatus: It is Time for IntermediateLevels of
Recognitionfor PartialCompliance,46 VA. J. INT'L L. 209, 222 (2005).
317. Bybee Memo, supra note 166, at 89-90.
318. Id.; see also Bialke, supra note 307, at 39-42.
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because of their position with Taliban." 9 Adopting the reasoning for
denying the Conventions to the Taliban (that the Taliban loses Article 4
status because of its relationship with al Qaeda), these proponents claim
al Qaeda should be entitled to prisoner of war status because they fought
alongside the Taliban in international armed conflict as members of
militia, volunteer corps, or organized resistance movements.32 ° It need not
matter whether al Qaeda are part of the Afghanistan "armed forces. 3 21 So
long as the Taliban qualify for prisoner of war status, members of al Qaeda
fighting with them should also qualify under Article 4(A)(4). 2
Regardless, nothing is lost by giving al Qaeda prisoner of war status since
they would still not get combat immunity for war crimes or crimes
associated with international terrorism. 323 Instead, those detained for their
association with terrorist activities could still be prosecuted for engaging
in illegal combat as unlawful combatants.324
But even if Common Article 2 were to apply because the GWOT is the
right kind of conflict and GCIII applies to the GWOT detainee as the right
kind of person, Article 5 tribunals may not necessarily be given if there is
no question or doubt as to prisoner status.
2. Whether Article 5 Applies to the GWOT
Even if the Conventions applied, advocates supporting the U.S.
position against application of the Conventions rejected Article 5 tribunals
because the status of Taliban and al Qaeda was never in doubt when it was
well known that "al-Qaeda and the Taliban en masse systematically and
willfully failed to meet the four criteria of lawful belligerency. 3 25 As such,
neither group received prisoner of war status, or an Article 5 tribunal.3 26

Article 5 tribunals were intended to provide "adhoc on-the-scene minimal
due process ...

[and] to ensure that a few displaced civilians or other

individual non combatant captives ' '327 who may have been inadvertently
detained 3 2at
8 or around the battlefield can be identified and promptly
released.

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Blocher, supra note 283, at 672.
Id.
Jinks, supra note 29, at 181-82.
Blocher, supra note 283, at 672.
Peal, supranote 29, at 1647.
Id.
Bialke, supra note 307, at 52.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 50.
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The tribunals were intended to provide a means for identifying
prisoners of war when status was uncertain either because they were
deserters with no uniform, had lost their identification card, or were lawful
combatants.3 29 But when a prisoner's status is known, just as when the
President declared all members of al Qaeda and Taliban as unlawful
combatants, no Article 5 tribunal is required.33 The presidential
declaration, the United States justified, was not unlike that made in
traditional armed conflict by combatant commanders when issues of status
are resolved based on intelligence from the field.331
Only when the combatant commander questions the intelligence does
he convene an Article 5 tribunal.332 Because the prisoners at GTMO were
presumptively declared unlawful combatants as members of either Taliban
or al Qaeda, none of them received Article 5 tribunals because "their status
' The United States
as POWs under Article 4 [was never] in doubt."333
claimed this unified declaration by the Commander-in-Chief was needed
to provide consistency throughout the theater by avoiding inconsistent
rulings from separate tribunals.334
On the other hand, and in response, a system providing some minimum
due process consistent with existing international legal norms is needed to
distinguish civilians from combatants, and lawful from unlawful
combatants. Whether Common Article 2 applies or not, without some form
of process, there is no method to distinguish al Qaeda, or Taliban, or
Northern Alliance, or civilians when none of those groups wear uniforms,
carry identification cards or bear a distinctive emblem. At the least, a
hearing is needed to distinguish those who will be released from those who
will be detained and prosecuted.335 Consistent with past practices, the
329. Id.at 49-51.
330. Id. at 54.
331. Biakle, supra note 307, at 53.
332. Miles P. Fischer, Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to "Armed Conflict" in the
War on Terror, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 509, 529 (2007).
333. Corn et al., supra note 139, at 334.
334. Fischer, supra note 332, at 528-29.
335. Human Rights Watch raised this concern to former Secretary Rumsfeld stating that the
United States may be holding civilians who are "protected persons" under GCIV. In a letter to
Donald Rumsfeld, Kenneth Roth, the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, stated:
The decision regarding the necessity of internment cannot be made collectively;
"each case must be decided separately." The United States is also obliged to
periodically review the necessity of continued internment and to release each
interned person "as soon as the reasons which necessitated his internment no
longer exist." In any case, unless the person is serving a prison sentence,
internment shall "cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities."
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United States could have provided some form of Article 5 tribunal to make
this distinction regardless of Common
Article 2, just as it had in Vietnam,
337
Grenada,336 and in the Iraq War.
3. Whether the CSRT Procedures are Sufficient for the GWOT
a. Whether the CSRT Provides Sufficient Process
The CSRT was supposed to satisfy the Supreme Court's requirements
following Hamdi and Rasul.335 Proponents of the system claim the CSRT
supports U.S. obligations under international law by providing a means to
determine the status of detainees, thus satisfying the requirement for a
"competent tribunal."339
'
In Hamdi, Justice O'Connor discussed, in dicta, procedures that might
be used to satisfy Hamdi's right to challenge his detention. She noted that
[t]here remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated
could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly
constituted military tribunal. Indeed, it is notable that military
regulations already provide for such process in related instances,
dictating that tribunals be made available to determine the status of
enemy detainees who assert prisoner-of-war status under the
Geneva Convention. See Headquarters Depts. of Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Corps, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, Army
Regulation 190-8, ch. 1, §§ 1-6 (1997)."34'

However, as CSRT critics claim, the CSRT procedures do not quite
meet Justice O'Connor's minimum standards.
Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to Donald Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense, U.S. Government, (Mar. 6, 2003), http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/03/us
030603-1tr.htm (internal citations and quotations omitted).
336. See ELSEA, supra note 138, at 36. But see Corn et al., supra note 139, at 332.
337. CLAMO, LEGAL LESSONS: VOLUME I, supra note 140, at 43-46; see also CLAMO,
LEGAL LESSONS: VOLUME II, supra note 140.
338. DOD FACT SHEET, supra note 192.
339. Douglas W. Kmiec, ConstitutionalLaw Symposium: Constitutionalismand the War on
Terror:Article: Observing the Separation of Powers: The President's War Power Necessarily
Remains "the Power to Wage War Successfully ", 53 DRAKE L. REV. 851,888 (2005); see also Paul
Rosenzweig, Response: On Liberty and Terror in the Post-9/J1 World: A Response to Professor
Chemerinsky, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 29, 38 (2005).
340. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004).
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(1) Burden of Proof
Unlike the presumption that each prisoner is a prisoner of war and the
government (or detaining power) has the burden to prove otherwise, the
CSRT gives the government a rebuttable presumption that evidence
against the detainee is true.34 1 In other words, the prisoner must prove he
is not an enemy combatant and must rebut all of the government evidence
to the contrary.
(2) Classified Evidence
Similarly, classified evidence may be viewed by the tribunal and used
against the detainee, but the detainee may not review the evidence or know
of its source for purposes of cross examination, even if the evidence is
mitigating to his favor.342 Evidence obtained through torture or other
coercive means that would otherwise be considered unreliable could still
be used at the CSRT, provided such evidence is "relevant and helpful. 343
The use of such coerced evidence is even more problematic when the
method for obtaining such coerced statements is classified. In such
instances, the detainee, let alone the pro se detainee, will have a difficult
time suppressing the evidence. 3 "
At the same time, the tribunal must presume that all evidence presented
by the military, including classified evidence, even if it is uncorroborated
or un-sourced, is genuine and accurate.34 5 In evaluating the evidence, the
tribunal may rely upon "any information it deems relevant and helpful,"
which may include hearsay, or evidence obtained through cruel, inhuman,
or coercive means. 34
(3) Minimal Discovery
Prisoners in the CSRT are entitled to minimal discovery. However,
military witnesses are only deemed "reasonably available" to testify at the
hearings "if, as determined by their commanders, their presence at a
hearing would [not] adversely affect combat... operations. 347 Witnesses
will not be determined "reasonably available" if "they decline properly
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

CSRT PROCEDURES, supra note 198, enclosure 1, at 6.
Id.enclosure 1, at 4.
Id.enclosure 1, at 6.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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made requests to appear at a hearing, if they cannot be contacted following
reasonable efforts by the CSRT staff, or if security considerations preclude
their presence at a hearing. ' This may conveniently keep interrogators
from appearing if they had obtained statements through torture or some
other questionable means. Furthermore, "[n]on-U.S. Government
witnesses will appear before the Tribunal at their own expense."3 49 Clearly
the ability to obtain witnesses is limited. It is highly unlikely that a poor
Afghan would be willing or able to pay for the cost of a flight to Cuba,
particularly when he can never be sure he will ever return.
(4) Delay in Proceedings
The CSRT fails to comply with the "meaningful time and manner"
standard described by Justice O'Connor. An Article 5 hearing is intended
to be conducted very near in time and in place to the point of capture
where witnesses are available and evidence is readily obtainable."' The
CSRT hearings, by contrast, were held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, after
several years since, and thousands of miles from, the point of capture.35 1
Any witnesses who could testify might be unavailable either because they
are in Afghanistan, or they could not be located (as is often the case with
indigenous Afghans), or the Government may decide that it cannot obtain
such witnesses because doing so would be cost-prohibitive. Besides,
removing an Afghan non-combatant from Afghanistan, particularly against
his will, to testify in Cuba may be considered a grave breach of the
Conventions and a war crime.352
In addition, evidence taken and held for more than three years by the
military (and by soldiers without legal training for seizing legal evidence)
may be unreliable, becoming stale or lost over time. This is particularly
important since the government's evidence is presumed reliable and the
detainee must bear the burden to rebut evidence by his own proffer.353
There is no option to challenge the chain of custody, or to question the
reliability of the methods for obtaining and preserving evidence.354 All of
this weighs to the credibility and reliability of evidence. Even if the
detainee could examine the evidence against him, the availability of
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Peal, supra note 29, at 1660.
351. See generally Combatant Status Review Tribunals/Administrative Review Boards,
availableat http://www.defenselink.mil/news/combatanttribunalsarchive.html.
352. See GCIV, supra note 30, arts. 49 & 147.
353. CSRT PROCEDURES, supra note 198, enclosure 1, at 6.
354. Id. § (F)4.
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resources for obtaining witnesses in his favor is slight, particularly when
he is unrepresented by legal counsel. "'
(5) Unlawful Command Influence
It is hard to imagine how a tribunal comprised of military officers
could be impartial when its task is to challenge the decision to designate
a prisoner as an enemy combatant, particularly when that designation has
come from the officer's superiors, including the Secretary of Defense and
the President of the United States. Such kinds of statements have been
grounds for dismissing charges under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice as unlawful command influence. 56
Along those same lines, the tribunal may only confirm or reject a
determination that a prisoner is an enemy combatant.357 The tribunal may
not challenge the President's February 7, 2002 determination that al Qaeda
or Taliban members are per se unlawful combatants.358 Once the prisoner
is ruled an enemy combatant, he is by implication an unlawful combatant
with no prisoner of war status. 359 Essentially, there is little leeway for the
tribunal upon which to adjudicate. By contrast, no such institutional
prejudice exists in an AR 190-8 hearing because the prisoner is presumed
to be a prisoner of war, unless the government proves he3is6 an unlawful
combatant, a civilian or a civilian who should be retained. 1
b. Whether the CSRT Identifies the Right Person
Unlike the Article 5 tribunal (and AR 190-8) where the tribunal may
determine whether a prisoner is a prisoner of war (and retained), a civilian
(and released), or a civilian accused of crimes (who should be retained),
the CSRT tribunal can make only one determination: whether or not the
prisoner is an enemy combatant.361
355. Id. enclosure 1, at 9.
356. In fact, two officers who sat on CSRT Tribunals have sworn that in cases where the panel
ruled a detainee not an enemy combatant, commanders subsequently reconvened the panel to hear
more evidence or just reversed the panel's decision. Michael Milia, U.S. Reviews GITMO
Combatant Hearings, AP, Oct. 12, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwpdyn/content/ article/2007/l 0/11 /AR2007101101462.html.
357.

CSRT PROCEDURES, supra note 198, enclosure 9.

358. Id. enclosure 1, at 1.
359. Even though a prisoner may be an enemy combatant, GCIII Article 5 and AR 190-8
provides that the prisoner may be considered a prisoner of war entitled to all of guarantees of his
status. GCIII, supra note 20, art. 5; AR 190-8, supra note 21.
360. AR 190-8, supra note 21.
361. Peal, supra note 29, at 1654.
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In Hamdi, an enemy combatant was defined as someone who has taken
"'part of or supported forces hostile to the United States or coalition
partners,' .. and who [has] 'engaged in... armed conflict against the
United States . . 362 However, the CSRT expands the definition to
include those who support Taliban or al Qaeda, including anyone who has
committed a belligerent act or directly supported hostilities of the
enemy.363 This new category of prisoner is "significantly broader than the
definition considered in Hamdi," as Judge Green of the U.S. District Court
noted. 3" Clearly, by expanding the definition, more prisoners will be (and
have been), retained as enemy combatants.365
The customary understanding for "combatant," which the Hamdi Court
initially seemed to embrace for defining "enemy combatant," has since
morphed into something much broader. On close examination the
definition provided by the CSRT regulations no longer require the
unlawful conduct to occur during the course of armed conflict.36 6 Neither
does the definition require a showing of dangerousness.367 This is
particularly troubling since restraint of dangerous persons is one of the
objectives for detention.368 Without either armed conflict or restraint, the
CSRT has essentially removed status from the context of IHL and into a
hybrid of criminal law and armed conflict.
Because the definition is so broad and because the CSRT tribunal is
limited to determining whether or not the prisoner is an enemy combatant,
any prisoner claiming to be a prisoner of war because he fought for the
Taliban would be, by definition, an enemy combatant. 369 Likewise, any
prisoner trying to avoid enemy combatant status by denying aid or
involvement with the Taliban would foreclose his ability to show he was
a valid prisoner of war.370 As a result of the definition, prisoners are caught
in a catch-22 and are left with little recourse at the CSRT.3 7 '

362. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527 (2004).
363. See ORDER, supra note 195, at 1.
364. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005).
365. This is supported by the evidence since only 38 of the 558 prisoners held at Guantanamo
Bay were not considered enemy combatants. SGT Sara Wood, Administrative Tribunals to Begin
for High-Value Guantanamo Detainees, AM. Forces Press Serv. News Art. (Mar. 6, 2007),
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=3283.
366. CSRT PROCEDURES, supra note 198, encl. 1, at 1.
367. Id.
368. Secretary of the Navy Gordon England Briefing, supra note 219.
369. CSRT PROCEDURES, supra note 198, at 1; e.g. Blocher, supra note 283, at 673-74.
370. Blocher, supra note 283, at 674.
371. Id. at 673.
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By making their belligerent conduct criminal, combatants have no
incentive to comply with the rules of war on capture.37 2 Similarly, and for
many of the reasons articulated by Secretary Powell, these combatants,
knowing they will be prosecuted as criminals on capture, will have less
incentive to surrender and more motivation to continue to fight
ferociously."'
In sum, neither Article 5 tribunals nor the CSRT are sufficient for
determining prisoner status in the GWOT. Article 5 is not applicable in
Common Article 3 conflicts and even if it were, it does not provide a
review process when considering the potential for indefinite detention in
the GWOT. The stakes for a perpetual detention as a combatant are higher
when considering prisoners are not represented by counsel in the tribunals,
evidence is admissible if probative, and the final status decision is not
made by a judge but by a simple majority of non-legally trained military
officers.374 Likewise, the CSRT fails to provide any due process. It only
allows one finding based on a very broad definition for enemy combatant
that essentially does not even require the prisoner to have engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition forces. Therefore, a
different system is needed for the GWOT.
C. Recommendations
Recognizing the relevance of the Conventions and the inherent
problems with the CSRT (which include reliance on unsubstantiated
evidence and coerced statements), this Article proposes that the current
system for distinguishing lawful and unlawful combatants in the GWOT
should be modified to include IHL and incorporation of pre-existing
systems, interalia,the AR 190-8, Israeli and UK Tribunals, and the CSRT
and the ARB. 37
Common Article 3 will be the baseline for the new approach or system.
In fact, the Supreme Court in Hamdan so provided.376 Besides Common
Article 3, the proposed model should derive its legal basis from IHL, the
substantive rights in GCIII Articles 99 and 103, API Article 75, and
ICCPR Article 9. These legal sources would provide minimum due
process guarantees that should be included in the proposed model.
372. Jinks, supra note 102, at 438.
373. Jensen, supra note 316, at 232.
374. CSRT PROCEDURES, supra note 198, at 1-2, 6.
375. Many commentators have written on suggested changes to the current CSRT system. One
such commentator deserves mention in regard to the following section. See Peal, supra note 29, at
1633-34.
376. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628-29 (2006).
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The definitions for the kinds of persons in armed conflict would be
derived from IHL while the norms and procedures would come from
comparative systems. For instance, from the UK model, a status hearing
would be given to prisoners regardless of doubt.3 77 In fact, a status hearing
would be given to all prisoners, just as in the CSRT, whether or not
Common Article 2 applies. Additionally, the proposed model should
satisfy reasons previously enumerated for detention. Finally, the new
model should address some means for review of the initial status
determination by the judiciary, much like in the Israeli model.378 Judicial
review is critical considering detention in the GWOT could last ad
infinitum.
1. Substantive Rights
Consistent with the Conventions, API and ICCPR, prisoners captured
in the GWOT should be immediately informed, in a language they
understand, of the reasons and process for their detention and potential
prosecution. Also, there must be a legitimate reason for arrest and
detention. In other words, prisoners should not be held and detained
indefinitely for no other reason than speculation. As such, prisoners could
be detained because they are combatants and they will be criminally
prosecuted. They may be arrested and detained initially for interrogation,
but just as Justice O'Connor noted in Hamdi,
prisoners may not be held
379
indefinitely for interrogation purposes only.
To address these concerns, all prisoners should receive a status hearing
as soon as practical from the point of arrest and detention. The hearing
shall determine status as one of the following: an innocent civilian who
should be released; a civilian who may be criminally prosecuted for war
crimes or domestic crimes; a lawful combatant who is a prisoner of war
and will be accorded all of the protections as such under GCIII; a lawful
combatant who may be prosecuted as a war criminal; an unlawful
combatant who will be held as such and not prosecuted; or, an unlawful
combatant who will be prosecuted before a domestic court or military
commission for violation of war crimes, violations of IHL, or violations
of domestic criminal law. Just as in the Israeli system, the initial status
hearing should be held within fourteen days from the date and place of
capture."' Classified material may be synopsized as in the Canadian
377. The Tribunal Procedure *Upper Tribunal) Rules, 2008 No. 2698 (L. 15), art. 2, 8 (U.K.).
378. Israel's Example, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2007, at A16, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/03/AR2007090301085.html
379. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519-20 (2004).
380. Israel'sExample, supra note 378, at A16.
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system and given to counsel under a protective order. Delays, provided
they are justified and founded on reason, may be granted at the discretion
of the tribunal.
Prisoners identified as potential combatants not subject to prosecution
will receive minimal guarantees set forth below. Those identified for
criminal prosecution will be entitled to increased due process rights, above
these minimal guarantees, consistent with the Conventions, API Article 75
and the ICCPR.
2. Procedural Changes
a. Minimum Rights
The minimum procedural safeguards available to all prisoners should
include the following:
First, the burden of proof should change from the existing presumption
in favor of the government. Instead, the initial burden of persuasion should
be upon the government to produce evidence with sufficient specificity
worth justifying a potential lifetime sentence of any particular detainee.
Once that burden is satisfied, the burden shifts to the prisoner, as in any
pre-trial detention hearing. Evidence may be admitted if it is relevant
(rather than simply probative).
Second, possible tribunal findings should be expanded for the GWOT
to include any ofthe following: innocent civilian; civilian held for possible
criminal prosecution; a lawful combatant and prisoner of war; a lawful
combatant to be prosecuted; an unlawful combatant held but not
prosecuted; or, an unlawful combatant who will be prosecuted. These
terms must be well defined for the tribunal. For instance, "combatants"
must be defined as in IHL. There must be a nexus with a combatant's
conduct and armed conflict (unlike the "enemy combatant" which does not
require conduct associated with armed conflict). The armed conflict must
be against the United States or one of its allies subsequent to 9/11. This
distinction is critical since many at Guantanamo are held as "enemy
combatants" but whose conduct is scarcely associated with hostilities or
armed conflict. Instead, these prisoners are more likely than not civilians
subject to prosecution for war crimes or domestic criminal law (i.e.,
terrorism).
Third, detainees should be provided with attorneys to represent them
throughout the proceedings. By doing so, not only would this improve the
U.S. global image, but more importantly, the weight and reliability of
evidence will be critically examined to ensure fundamental fairness to the
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process. Similarly, the tribunal should consist of legally trained military
judges to ensure evidence is given its due accord. Prisoners should be
determined as unlawful combatants only if the majority of the judges agree
the evidence shows, at a minimum, by a clear and convincing standard, the
prisoner is a combatant. Considering the potential for detention, a
heightened standard is necessary.
Fourth, under a protective order, the detainee or his attorney should be
permitted to review classified information, particularly if it is exculpatory.
In the alternative, classified evidence may be handled in a manner similar
to Military Rule of Evidence 505 (or as in the U.S. Classified Information
Protection Act, MCA, Israeli or Canadian systems) which provides Judges
with options for handling classified information.3 1 This is a system that
has worked within the context of the military, and should do so again,
particularly when military judges familiar with the process and system are
incorporated.
Fifth, some form of review process is needed as in the Israeli approach
where incarceration decisions are reviewed every six months.382 A review
should be made initially and then semi-annually thereafter. But instead of
review by a civilian court, a military appellate court should be tasked with
the review. At this phase, review of classified information relevant to any
adverse determination may be made in camera with fewer concerns for
public disclosure. The standard for review may be two fold: one for those
held as combatants and another for those held for prosecution.3 83 The
detaining power must present a compelling reason for continued
incarceration, particularly as detention continues for years. The court will
also have jurisdiction over matters relating to the detaining power'sjailers.
Any issues regarding the manner or mode of incarceration may be raised
by the reviewing authority.
b. Additional Rights for Prisoners Subject to Prosecution
Once a prisoner is identified to be criminally prosecuted, he should be
given additional substantive and procedural rights. Since jurisdiction for
the military commission is based, in part, on the status hearing, a greater
level of process is required. Additionally, if a prisoner is not a combatant,
but simply an accused terrorist or criminal, then he should be given
additional rights.
Identification as an accused may occur at any phase of detention: the
prisoner may be initially determined an accused; the prisoner may be
381. MILITARYR.EvID. 505.
382. Israel'sExample, supra note 378, at A16.
383. Discussed in greater detail in the next subsection.
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initially considered a combatant but the tribunal rules he should be subject
to prosecution; or, the prisoner may be initially determined and held as a
combatant and then subsequently deemed subject to prosecution either by
the detaining authority or the reviewing court. Once identified for
prosecution, the prisoner will be afforded a tribunal with additional rights.
For instance, added rights as an accused would be triggered when the
prisoner is suddenly questioned by a criminal investigator instead of by a
military intelligence interrogator. At this point, additional rights would
apply. The government will have the initial burden to show why the
prisoner was not identified previously as an accused, thus preventing bad
faith interrogations by the government.
The moment a prisoner is considered an accused, those rights provided
by GCII, Articles 84, 99, 103, and 105, API Article 75 and ICCPR Article
9 apply. These rights should include, at least, the right against selfincrimination, the right to an attorney, the right to examine witnesses,
credit for pre-trial detention and most important, a right to a speedy trial.
Compliance with these basic rights must be reviewable by the court.
In addition, the traditional rules of evidence and procedure as
promulgated under the UCMJ should apply at the proceedings. Because
prisoners will be given the right to a speedy trial at which point the burden
will be greater, the initial burden at the tribunal phase may remain.
Finally, the review process should include both review of the
procedural safeguards and a review of when the prisoner became an
accused. Otherwise, a detaining power could hold a prisoner indefinitely
as a combatant while at the same time, develop a criminal case against
him. Because of the potential for abuse, the basis for detention,
justification for detention, or delayed referral of criminal charges must be
issues subject to review by the court.

V. CONCLUSION

After twenty-eight months of incarceration, Marwan Jabour, an
accused al-Qaeda paymaster once described by a U.S. counterterrorism
official as "a committed jihadist and a hard-core terrorist who was intent
on doing harm to innocent people, including Americans"--was released
eight months ago. 3 U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism officials
confirmed his incarceration in Pakistan and Afghanistan.385
384. Dafner Linzer & Julie Tate, NewLight Shedon CIA's "BlackSite"Prisons, WASH. POST,
Feb. 28, 2007, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.con/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/02/27/AR2007022702214.html.
385. Id.
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This case is just one of the many which show the inherent flaws in the
CSRT procedures. Such other notable examples include the cases of
Moazzam Begg, Feroz Abbasi, Martin Mubanga, Richard Belmar, Murat
Kurnaz.38 6 "Washington had claimed all four were 'enemy combatants'
who trained at camps run by al Qaida. But they were released after UK
police concluded there was not enough evidence to charge them with any
'
offence."387
In Kurnaz, the Washington Postreviewed approximately 100 pages of
documents and reports used against him as evidence at his CSRT.388
However, reporters found no evidence that Kurnaz had any ties to
terrorism. 389Shortly before his tribunal an unsigned memo had been added
to his file which concluded he was an al Qaeda member.39 °
In another instance, Federal Judge Green noted that the military relied
heavily on reported confessions of detainees to determine enemy
combatant status.39 ' She expressed skepticism about the reliability of
confessions considering widespread allegations including some evidence
of abuse during interrogations.392 Unfortunately, these were very typical
examples of the kind of unreliable, uncorroborated, unsubstantiated
allegations that have been used as evidence to hold or arrest detainees as
enemy combatants.
Professor Mark P. Denbeaux has prepared a series of reports based on
517 Combatant Status Report Tribunal reports data released by the
Department of Defense. What Denbeaux found was astonishing: less than
55% of those detained were accused of committing a hostile act against the
United States or its coalition; 8% were considered al Qaeda fighters by
DOD; 40% have no connection with al Qaeda and 18% have no
connection to al Qaeda or Taliban.393 Denbeaux testified before the Senate
Armed Services Committee in April 2007, and cited as a typical example
386. Ian Herbert & Ben Russell, The Americans are breakinginternationalLaw... it is a
Society heading towards Animal Farm, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 18, 2006, availableat http://news.
independent.co.uk/world/americas/article346214.ece.
387. Id.
388. Carol D. Leonnig, PanelIgnoredEvidence on Detainee,WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2005, at
AOL, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A3868-2005Mar26?language=
printer.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Carol D. Leonnig, Judge Rules Detainee TribunalsIllegal, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2005,
at AOL, availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51007-2005Jan31.html.
392. Id.
393. MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 517
DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA (2006), at 2, available at
http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamoreportfinal_2_08-06.pdf.
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a detainee who was conscripted by the Taliban and forced to be a cook's
assistant.39 4 The detainee fled during an attack in Narim and surrendered
to the Northern Alliance.395 However, this particular detainee was
considered an enemy combatant because he provided material support for
the Taliban.396 According to the DOD records, 60% of those held at
Guantanamo are not alleged to be fighters for the Taliban or al Qaeda.3 97
To the contrary, they are held because of their association with those
groups.3 98 In fact, according to Denbeaux, as many as 92% of those held
in Guantanamo were not even captured on the battlefield.399
In addition to the initial capture and identification, issues have recently
surfaced with regards to the actual CSRT process and the potential for
unlawful command influence. Recently, two military officers assigned to
the CSRT claim that in instances when a tribunal determined a detainee
was not an enemy combatant, senior commanders ordered the panel to
reverse the decision.4 °°
The many men released from Guantanamo can now tell their stories
how they were once classified as hardened al Qaeda terrorists or
"jihadists" but subsequently released without explanation or apology.
Clearly, there is a flaw in the system when hundreds of men spend years
imprisoned without cause and are subjected to endless accusation,
humiliation and interrogation, and then one day are deemed to no longer
enemy combatants. As more proceedings are declassified and summary
transcripts are released, the inherent problems with the CSRT may become
more prevalent.
Both the CSRT and the Article 5 tribunals are inadequate processes for
determining status in the GWOT. Neither the United States implementing
regulations under Article 5 nor the CSRT procedures provide the sufficient
means for determining status of prisoners in the GWOT. The Conventions
do not consider a conflict such as the GWOT which may never end, and
394. MARK P. DENBEAUX, THE 14 MYTHS OF GUANTANAMO, SENATE ARMED SERVICES
(Apr. 26, 2007), at 2, availableat http://law.shu.edu/media/fourteen_
mythsof gtmofinal.pdf.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.at 2, 7.
398. Id.
399. Id.at 7.
400. See also Abraham Declaration, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/
archives/Al%200dah%20reply%/0 206-22-07.pdf. The substance of the declaration is available in the
Teesdale Declaration, availableat http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2007/10/
hamad-declaration-10-5-07.pdf. Leonard Doyle, GuantanamoMilitary Lawyer Breaks Ranks to
Condemn "Unconscionable" Detention, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 27, 2007, availableat http://news.
independent.co.uk/world/americas/article3101949.ece.
COMMITTEE STATEMENT,
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if it does, how to objectively determine when it would end. Without an end
of hostilities, there are no means for releasing prisoners at the end of the
GWOT. Without a means for release, identification as a combatant in the
GWOT could possibly subject the prisoner to a life sentence. Such
consequences are graver when considering that status determinations
under AR 190-8 are made without the assistance of legal counsel by
military officers with no legal experience based on evidence that is simply
probative and admitted by a preponderance standard. The tribunal's
decision under Article 5 and AR 190-8 are not even subject to review. The
CSRT similarly fails its intended purposes in the GWOT because it fails
to provide sufficient due process and therefore does not properly identify
correct prisoner status. The CSRT designation of enemy combatant is so
broadly defined, allowing the admission of unreliable evidence presumed
reliable, the basis of which cannot be contested, and that most anyone
standing before that body would most certainly be considered an enemy
combatant.
Because of all these inadequacies, it is time to change the current
means for determining status of prisoners in the Global War on Terror. A
new model is needed for the twenty-first century.
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